<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Otto:
I was just wondering why we hear of air commanders of every nation save for the USSR.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I am not certain on this point - if others know better, please correct me - but I believe the Soviet Air Force was too much divided into subordinate groups for each Army - 'Army' in Soviet force structure closer to Allied term Corps; a group of some relatively small number of divisions (even smaller than Allied corps). So the Soviet air commander was like the man commanding artillery for Patton, or logistics for Montgomery - not exactly household names.
There was no person like Air Marshal Dowding (Battle of Britain) who was personally personally responsible for a central role in the air war. And air war was not a big part of the Russo-German conflict anyway; not on the Allies' strategic scale. Soviet airmen did well in local tactical support, but there was no big Soviet strategic-level air campaign; offense or defense.
Now to think of it, I would have to put Dowding on the list of great WWII commanders.
He had figured out the strategy he needed, and he was clear in what would save his country. He privately expressed he was grateful when Goring began to bomb London instead of airfields: Goring could kill many civillians that way, and make many more quite miserable, but only by knocking out Britain's air defense could the Germans ultimately defeat Britain.
Dowding was also able to get his strategy implemented despite strong political pressure to the contrary. Lest anyone doubt the necessity of a general to play politics well so his strategy is implemented, just look at what happened to Westmoreland. Doenitz is another example. If Guderian had posessed this skill, there might still be Nazis running Germany (and Middle East, France, Poland, Czech Republic) today.
Much credit is given to the British radar, but many British commanders saw the same radar intercepts and advocated a losing strategy. Dowding was the one who knew how to use radar and defense coordination systems to stay alive, and out-last Goring's Luftwaffe.
Maybe this points to one important quality of the great wartime commander: ability to see the problem clearly and focus on winning conditions without getting distracted by irrelevant 'clutter' considerations.
|