Nice post.
It is interesting that Bayer quotes MacDonald's book the Sirgfreid line but fails to quote from the same author's book "The Battle of the Huertgen Forest" in which MacDonald states that neither side realised the value of the Roer Dams until well into the battle.
But I take issue with the statement about guarding flanks.
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During World War I, General Pershing had major problems with German troops attacking his flanks out of the Argonne Forest. Well aware of Pershing’s problem, Collins was adamant on making sure his flanks were protected.
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This is straight out of world war one doctrine and discounts lessons that should have been learned (were learned by Monty) about how to conduct a Blitzkrieg.
The lesson of Blitzkrieg is that Armoured divisions escheloned in column prevents any threat from flank attack by virtue of the strength of the forces arriving directly behind the spearhead. The key is to upset the balance of the enemy and to continue to attack in order to deny the opponent from setting up a defendable line.
This does not happen in a drawn out slug fest lasting several months. And the Generals in charge of the American thrust in Huertgen should have known that from the experiences of 4 years of bloody struggle only 30 years earlier.
The Roer Dams had no stregic value unless an assault was made to cross the Roer. And no plans were in the works to make such an attack. Had the Roer been threatened after the successful assault on Aachen, those dams would not have been destroyed in a defensive measure since no plans were made to do so. It was only the dedicated attack through the Huertgen that alerted the Germans to the strategic value of the dams.
So a bold move to cross the Roer and capture the dams from the German side if necessary was not contemplated. Why? Because Monty's bold plan to capture Arnhem had failed and no Allied commander was going to suggest another bold plan.
Consequences?
The battle for the Hurtgen Forest and tens of thousands of casualties, mainly American and mainly green troops.
By this time in the war the American high command had not learned the fundamental lesson that the best way to defeat a defended position was to go around it. This lesson was taught to the world by the German Panzer Divisions in every campaign until 1941.
The frontal attack on the forest virtually destroyed the 9th Infantry Division as a viable organization. This was, after all, an infantry v infantry slugfest where the American ace cards of artillery and air support could not be played. So one after another infantry division was fed into the meat grinder. The Keystone Division replaced the 9th I.D. and was, according to MacDonald, "thrown to the wolves". After two weeks of action the Division although
being numerically up to strength was so short of experienced personnel that it was considered to be only 20% combat effective.
The best comment from Bayer is contained in Bayer's very first paragraph yet he offers no explanation for his astounding statement.
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World War II histories about the European theater spend much of the time talking about the D-Day invasion, Operation Cobra, Market Garden, The Battle of the Bulge, and the final surrender of Nazi German. These events all occurred between June-September 1944 and December-May 1944-1945. Very little time is spent on the events that occurred between September and December of 1944.
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It could be that all the good news of 1944 was overshadowed by the inexcuseable failure by Montgomery in his attempt to take a bridge too far. To suggest that American planners and generals could make a similar mistake would be embarrassing.