The tides of war had begun to shit against the Axis in 1940, and by 1942, had clearly manifested themselves. Over the course of 1943, they would become more clear, and consume much of the strength of Japan, Italy, and Germany, thus preventing them from acting capably after that same year's conclusion. From 1944 to 1945, it was merely a matter of time. Berlin's gambles became ever more outrageous, while Japan could no longer effectively project any sort of power.

In order to rectify problems such as this, changes would have to be made to German policies as early as 1936. From that point until the official start of the war with the blitzkrieg of Poland - in 1939, the Italian armies should have been better-trained.

Germany did not gain the capacity to throw armored divisions at its opponents until after the capture of the Czech industries (notably Skoda), and similarly never focused on any one design. Although its tanks were of excellent quality, the small numbers produced by the Germans, and the attrocious state of Berlin's supply situation, prohibited a more successful prosecution of the war.

The war should have begun in 1938, even before the Germans were entirely ready. They should have begun their operations with the invasion of first Poland, then France. Mars El Kabir should not have been lost, and instead been the victim of an Italian land assault, in conjunction with the 4 German armored divisions later required to overrun the Middle East.

With some capable naval strength - including two carriers of the Joffre class, Germany could at least have projected more effectively into the Mediterranean.

The war in that theater should have begun with heavy German strikes at Malta, Marseilles, and Gibraltar from bases throughout Italy and now-occupied France. The German divisions should have swept through the Middle East to occupy the Suez. This completed, one motorized and three regular divisions should have been left in Egypt and Cyranaeica, while the remaining 3 divisions of armor swept through the Middle East and captured the supplies of oil - or at the very least, deprived burning fields to the British, who might have been hard-pressed to commit to a scorched-earth policy anyway, considering the rebellious state of the Arab population in the region - which would have delivered Iraq, in complete, to Germany.

Turkey would have been convinced to join the war. Having been given 1 armored division in 1938, it might have been better able to prosecute against the Caucasus in an invasion of Russia in 1941. Barbarossa was not ill-timed. The Germans were hardly ready, and Stalin was at least preparing to face down Hitler - though not quite so soon as the invasion date.

Britain should have been left to its own devices. The Luftwaffe strength lost there would have been put to better use elsewhere. Again, Germany should have deployed the following:

Eastern Front: Panzer: Motorized: Infantry: Total:

Reserve: 1 pzr 1 mtr 6 inf 8 ttl
Group North: 3 pzr 2 mtr 23 inf 28 ttl
Group Centre: 6 pzr 5 mtr 39 inf 53 ttl
Group South: 5 pzr 2 mtr 38 inf 45 ttl

Other Theaters: Panzer: Motorized: Infantry: Total:

Southeast: 7 inf 7 ttl
Afrika Korps: 4 pzr 1 inf 5 ttl
Denmark: 1 inf 1 ttl
Norway: 10 inf 10 ttl
Other Theaters: 2 pzr 57 inf 59 ttl
Total, German: 21 pzr 10 mtr 163 inf 194 ttl

Eastern Front: Armored: Motorized: Infantry: Total:

Rumania: 2 arm 1 mtr 18? inf 21? ttl
Hungary: 2 arm 2 mtr 10? inf 14? ttl
Slovakia: 1? arm 1? mtr 2? inf 4? inf
Lithuania: ? ?
Finland: 1 arm ? inf ? ttl
Italy: 3 arm 2 mtr 8 inf 13 ttl
Turkey: 2 arm 1 mtr 8 inf 11 ttl
Spain: 1 mtr 8 inf 9 ttl

Assuming the Ukraine, Baltic, and Polish nations were treated as something more than human, Hitler might have gleaned signifigant numbers of divisions from collaborators only too happy to turn against their Soviet masters. It was this mistake of seeking the complete annihilation of the Slavs that lost Hitler valuable time and stability of supply lines, thus hampering - and perhaps even dooming - his campaign.

Turkish and German pressure on the Cacasus, and the solidarity of Italy's African army might have opened further options to the Axis, who could then apply a pincer movement previously unknown.

Again, better supply of the Finns, and better deployment of the Luftwaffe - whom would not be commited to the Battle of Britain - might have aided the Germans signifigantly.

Similarly, Japan doomed the Axis by attacking the United States, and Germany again doomed herself by first declaring war on Washington.

Italy made a strategic blunder in attacking Greece, while Hitler made a strategic blunder in focusing on varied and myriad projects with precious funds.

Spain, other than the contribution of a few divisions, would never "move off the fence." The best one could hope for is limited support for Barbarossa by "volunteers", and a half-hearted strike on Gibraltar, perhaps supported by 1 German Panzer and 1 Airborne division.

[ 12 May 2001: Message edited by: Desert Journeyman ]

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"Do not piss down my back, Senator, and then tell me it rains." - Augustus Caesar