Germany almost won the war in 1940/41. The decision to abort Sealion came about because of several reasons (some of wich you mentioned). Yet Germany did have the potential to defeat Britian directly had she prepared in a more senseable fashion. When the Germans were planning the attack on France there was little or no consideration as to what to do if England continued to fight after France's fall. Hitler figured (and rightfully so) that Britian had nothing to gain and everything to lose if she were to continue hostilities with the Third Reich after a French defeat. If the German High Command had drawn up a detailed and concrete plan for Sealion (like that created for "Sickle Stroke") early on, then they would have avioded the following mistakes:
a.) Dunkirk
b.)poor planning for the need of beach landing craft & transport (no, German industry was not geared for amphibious vechicles but improvisations could have been made at a much earlier date)
c.)the failure to fully capitalize on Germany's excellent airborne divisions for paradrop operations against England
d.) the failure to prepare as many airfields as possible on the Channel coast at the earliest possible date
e.)the failure to build up a massive force to be unleashed in decisive blow that was typical of German operations
f.) Hitler's indecisiveness in the summer of 1940 on how to deal with England, thus giving his enemy more time to prepare
As it was the Luftwaffe almost defeated the RAF in the skies above Britian. When the Germans initially concentrated their attacks on airfeilds, fighter production plants, and other related air defense industries, they almost brought the RAF to its knees in the early weeks of the "Blitz". Of course Hitler and his generals didn't know this, and in their haste decided to bomb British cities instead. "If there was one battle the Germans lost but should have won, it was the air war over England". I don't remember who said this but I would have to agree.
As for as the Eastern Front is concerned Barbarrossa was a gamble. It was thought by the Germans (along with most western governments) that destroying the forward divisions of the Red Army while capturing Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states would cause a military and political collapse in the Soviet system.
The Soviet military was a pathitic combat force in 1941. Just look at the Red Army's performance in the first year of the conflict. They had no organized armoured divisions, most units were poorly trained and led. They lacked wireless communications, and were almost incapable of movement.
What the Russians did prove to be good at was taking punishment. Their willingness to stand and fight against an enemy that was in almost every way their superior bought them the time to reconstitute their Army. What they lacked in skill and organization they made up for in numbers and armaments production. I would even go as far to say that the Wehrmacht was an overall more effective combat force up untill the Battle of Kursk.

[ 08. June 2003, 08:41 PM: Message edited by: Peiper44 ]