I love this board, this is the topic of yet another of my masters papers... [img]smile.gif[/img]

In July of 1945, Japan was not about to surrender. The cabinet was formed of three factions. The army, which was completely against surrender, The navy, who supported the army, though their voice was minimal as they were a disgraced faction, the IJN had been wiped out at this point, and the civilian leaders, who were split, but most favoured some kind of peace settlement.

The Army had the power to VETO any decision, and could in fact force a new cabinet (they had done this several times throughout the war). they refused to consider peace, and refused to countenance any treaty. They had this power because the Army could still point to the vast stocks of men and supplies on the Home islands and in Manchuria, which comprised about 80% of the Army's pre-war strength. because of the nature of island hopping, Japan still had a strong army, unengaged and distant from the fighting. However, the remaining forces were mostly second line, and equipped with obsolete equipment.

The first atomic bomb did very little. We have all the reports from the cabinet, and it ranged from boredom (army commander surveying the site the day after claimed the damage was less than the march 2nd and 3rd conventional raids on Tokyo) to incredulity (Civilian leaders thought the allies has dispersed strips of magnesium in their air and then set them on fire, even those who believed it was an atomic weapon claimed that the US could not repeat such a feat)

Either way, it did not in any way change the single-mindedness of the Army. Even as members of the civilian faction tried to negotiate some kind of possibility through contacts in Russia, the Army sentenced to Death several Japanese ambassadors and minor dignitaries who made peace feelers to the West.

Then came the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. In one swoop, the Kwangtung army was annihilated, and the claims of strength of the Army faction evaporated. The Army lost enormous face here, which allowed the civilian faction to claim dominance. Still the debate about a course of action raged.

The second bomb demonstrated that the US had repeating power of destruction, and following that, the debate on surrender was deadlocked. It took a personal intercession from the Emperor (something that almost never happened) to convince the Cabinet for peace.

Even once this had been done and surrender was decided, the Army refused to accept the decision. They staged a coup that night planning on putting the emperor in ‘protective custody’ before he could announce his surrender, and continue the war. The coup failed, barely, and the Emperor made his announcement. About 30% of the high officer corps either boarded kamikaze planes and attacks the US fleet or committed suicide following that announcement.


So when people ask me if the bombs were really necessary, I say not only were they necessary, but they were not enough. Two bombs and the invasion of Manchuria and the intercession of the emperor were required to force surrender, and even then there was a coup to prevent it. Even with the two bombs, Japan almost did not surrender.


The ASrmy had the power to VETO any decision, and could in fact force a new cabinet (they had done this several times throughout the war). they refused to consider peace, and refused to countenance any treaty. They had this power because the Army could still point to the vast stocks of men and supplies on the Home islands and in manchuria, which comprised about 80% of the Army's pre-war strength. because of the nature of island hopping, Japan still had a strong army, unengaged and distant from the fighting. However, the remaining forces were mostly second line, and equipped with obsolete equipment.

The first atomic bomb did very little. We have all the eports from the cabinet, and it ranged from boredom (army commander surveying the site the day after claimed the damage was less than the march 2nd and 3rd conventional raids on Tokyo) to incredulity (Civilian leaders thought the allies has dispersed strips of magnesium in their air and then set them on fire, even those who believed it was an atomic weapon claimed that the US could not repeat such a feat)
Either way, it did not in any way change the singleminded ness of the Army. Even as members of the civilian faction tried to negotiate some kind of possibility through contacts in Russia, the Army sentenced to Death several japanese ambasadors and minor dignitaries who made peace feelers to the West.