What Cooper's book really misses is that tank fighting didn't occur in a vacuum. There are a myriad of other considerations here that need be discussed.
By 1944 German tank tactics were often just plain bad. They had learned a good many really bad lessons fighting the Russians that they applied to fighting the Western Allies much to their own demise. Here are a few with examples:

1. The idea that Tigers were invincible and Panthers nearly so. Wittmann's battles prove the case here. At Viller's Brocage his boldness worked. A few days later against the Canadians he died in a hail of hits as the Canadians easily plastered his exposed Tiger with round after round. Unlike the Russians with their nearly blind T34/76s that mostly lacked radios and other refinements, the Canadian Shermans had better vision equipment, radios and, better crew efficency. Too much time in the East had taught Tiger crews to expect a lethargic response in tank on tank combat.

2. "Leading with your face" as I like to call it. The Germans regularly attacked in the East without prior reconnissance and often with very imbalanced units. It wasn't uncommon for units to be mostly or all armor, go unsupported by artillery and, not infrequently, infantry. In the West this was simply disasterous. Wittmann's run at Villers Brocage was meaningless in the long run. He lost his tank, and the other three vehicles with him for an unsustainable tactical success.
In the Lorraine in September, the 106th Panzer Brigade led by Obrest Dr. Franz Bake, a Knight's cross holder and panzer legend got literally shot to pieces in a single engagement against the US 90th Infantry Division.
Dr. Bake's command attacked without artillery or reconnissance. His command was split down several routes for speed.
Instead of routing each small group of defenders he encountered as usually happened in the East, the 90th got on the air and within minutes after the first engagments Bake found he was attacking into an alert hornet's nest of resistance. Artillery followed in short order. The attached 607th (towed 3") Tank Destroyer Battalion was ready and engaged his columns very successfully. His flanks were quickly threatened by counter attacks by the attached 712th Tank Battalion.
After blundering into repeated ambushes, he called off the attack having lost nearly half his command and accomplishing nothing. His losses were 762 casualities or captured, 21 of 47 tanks lost, 60 of 113 halftracks destroyed and 100 supporting soft skins lost. Only 9 tanks were reported operational.
This story repeats itself from Normandy to VE day in the West.
Why? Because the Germans lost badly enough each time and lacked the capacity within their largely abbreviated training periods to digest the lessons being learned in these disasters and change their tactics. They simply lacked the corporate memory necessary to enact significant change.

3. Speer's decision to reduce non-combatant vehicle production and related items in favor of more arms also had an effect. By late '44 there were few, if any, German mechanized divisions that had anything close to their full maintenance capability. Most lacked ARV making recovery of damaged vehicles difficult or impossible. This made everything from refueling to repairs more time consuming and difficult.

These are but a few of many different causes that led to heavy German casualities and go a long way to explain why the loss ratios favor the Western Allies in armored combat.