Quote:
Originally posted by T. A. Gardner:
As for the DLM, it likewise had the equivalent of one battalion of infantry assigned to it. This is why at Hannut / the Gembloux Gap in Belgium General Prioux had to quit the field even though he had won a pyrrhuic victory over the German panzers. The Corps de Cavalarie simply lacked anything with which to hold the field! The three DLMs of the Corps could have barely scraped together a weak regiment of infantry between them.
Terry A. Gardner
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Not so sure of this.
The DLM (Light Mechanized Division) had a TOE complement of 2 Tank Regiments, each with 180 tanks. This was supported by one Motorized Infantry Regiment consisting of three Infantry Battalions or about 3000 men.
It is not possible to equate the French armoured division with the German panzer division because of doctrine. French armoured divisions were intended to be used in concert with infantry divisions. Therefore the infantry component should have been much more prominent. At Hannut the problem was two-fold. Firstly one of the French regiments, the 3e DLM had a very high proportion of reservists and sustained heavy losses while the more experienced crews of the 2e DLM in the same battle had only light losses. In 1940, when the French crews were experienced with their tanks they were at the level of the German tankers.
They knew how to operate their tanks, even if it was a bit different than for a German crew. The 2e DLM in Hannut/Gembloux had rather light losses and proved to be a dangerous opponent. Many German tanks were knocked out but as the ground was later controlled by the Germans they could recover/repair the damaged ones unlike the
French which had also to abandon several tanks due to mechanical breakdowns.
A French tank is more intricate and becomes a deadly and efficient weapon only with experienced crews. A rookie crew will have several drawbacks. History has shown that the experienced French crews were at level with their German opponents.
In the battle of Hannut/Gembloux for example, the Somua S35 tanks could spread havoc among the German tanks, which often had to face a second Somua S35 squadron while trying to outflank the first squadron. In this battle, the French tactical regulation proved to be at level, the German tank formations being often attacked on their flanks or rear.
Secondly, German doctrine called for the Panzers to avoid French armour and attack elsewhere, thereby allowing the German anti-tank guns to destroy French tanks. Poor strategic co-ordination of French divisions and the lack of radios in all tanks impeded the French tank crews who often found themselves fighting alone amongst their comrades.