Kai - This is a very good book. I was lucky enough to get a hardback version for only 5 quid!! it should have been 65 quid. His analysis is very good and he does offer a sound explination for the initial failure of the British Army in Normandy. Effectively he argues that the Army misunderstood lessons from North Africa and that these were translated into the home army. His major gripe is with infantry - armour co - operation and here he blames Monty for argueing that infantry and armour should not co - operate together. This was ok for in North Africa were infantry always had problems in an heavily motorised war but in N W Europe they were certainly needed. The best thing he does is place the initial failings into context unlike historians before him such as Hastings and D'Este.
I would suggest you read it in conjunction with these books in order to get a fuller picture:
Buckley, John, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2004)
French, David, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
Hart, Stephen, Montgomery and Colossal Cracks: The 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Westview: Greenwood Press, 2000)
Ross
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