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The idea was German grab major stocks in Antwerp - small chance.
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This tactical part of the plan was almost absurd. You make a plan assuming that you will capture enough fuel to reach Antwerp is rather silly. Though it was the only was to get fuel at the time...
Besides, I forgot something really important about Allied supplies.
We all know that during the summer-autumn campaign the Allies had a tremendous success and often advanced far quicker than their supply lines which started at Normandy beachheads —something Patton didn't consider when he stated that he could have reached Berlin by Christmas if the supplies would have been given all to him...
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The Allied rolling machine stopped in the German border because the supply lines were over-extended and French roads were too crowded. Thanks to Hitler's very clever order to his port-garrisons to stand as long as possible. Dunkirk, Boulogne, Calais, Le Havre, Cherbourg; all held for a long time and even if some were captured, they had to be refitted and still were too far away from the front. That is why it was imperative to have a very big port as close to the front as possible if they wanted to push into Germany. The only choice available was Antwerp and Hitler knew it.
What he didn't know was that when Antwerp was captured in September (?)
the Germans destroyed it and the Allies had to work in it for months and it was not ready until early 1945. So, at the time of the Battle of the Bulge Antwerp was not playing any rôle at all in Allied logistics. So, it couldn't have happened the impact Hitler and his close advisors —Jodl included— believed.
As we all know, the force gathered for 'Wacht am Rhein' could have used to defend the Reich's borders using elastic defense, in east and west. But the Germans gained nothing and lost irreplaceable vehicles, tanks and 100.000 men. They speeded the end of the war —fortunately.