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Old September 17th, 2002, 09:24 AM
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On those Panthers in "The Panther tank" by Dr Matther Hughes and Dr Chriss Mann:

" The Panther was simply nit ready for action at Kursk.The roads and tracks between the railheads and the assembly areas for Kursk were soon littered with Panthers which had broken down with transmission failures and engine fires.

In the end, the Germans deployed just two Panther-equipped tank battalions to participate in Kursk, and these fought on the southern front in a separate "battle Group Kempf". In addition the Germans reinforced some of their panzer divisions with a third tank battalion with the formidable Tiger tank.The other two battalions used a variety of tanks. Most panzer divisions had battalions equipped with the Panzer III and IV. However, one or two divisions, such as the 11th Panzer, besides a battalion of Tigers, also had a battalion of Pz IVīs and one of Panthers. Thus Panthers fought in penny packets in units other than the "Kempf" battle group.

In all, some 250 Panthers AusfD tanks participated in operaiton Citadel, mostly in 51st and 52nd Panzer battalions which were combined into the improvised "Kempf" Panther Brigade.At Kursk, the Panther AusfD made an inauspicious operational debut on July 5th, as these tanks suffered severe reliability problems.Many had even problems even reaching the front line.
This combiantion of mechanical and tactical problems resulted in the 51st Panzer Battalion suffering a disastrous 56 per cent loss rate on its first day of action.By the second day of the Kursk offensive, just one fifth of the Panthers committed remained operational, a tremendous drop-out rate testifying to the ill-judged speed with which the tanks were thrown into combat.

Gefreiter Werner Kriegel in a Panther of the 51st Panzer Battalion recalled the bitter fighting at Kursk:
"Our first attack stuck in a minefield. I lost a track.While our artillery suppressed the Soviets, we could recover both disabled tanks..
The first day ended in disaster.By the evening of the 5th, Pz Battalion 51 had only 22 Panthers operational. Some 28 tanks or so were totally destroyed, the rest damaged. My comrades complained of weak final drives and of their engines overheating...On the 8th July we again headed for Obojan south of Kursk.Our Panther received a hit from a tank gun on the commanderīs cupola. We carried on the attack with an open hatch and a cracked cupola. My commander still has the shell...We lost one tank to one of those heavy assault guns ( SU-152 ), the mantlet was simply penetrated.We also met American tanks, which were no match for us..We destroyed a number of T-34īs at ranges well over 2500 metres."

Kriegelīs Panthers fought on the southern edge of the Kursk salient as a separate detachment to Hothīs FourthPanzer Army which spearheaded the main attack.

In defence, the Soviets established what the Germans called "Pakfronts". These were a complex pattern of strongpoints, based upon groups of tanks, anti-tank guns protected by deep minefields, and sited to a depth of cover ( 19.3 km). These Pakfronts called for new tactics by the Germans as the Russian system meant that in battle, up to 10 guns would open up on the German lead tank.

The Panthers at Kursk and after were built into fromations known as Panzerkeil.This evolded into Panzerglockeby 1944. This was abell-shaped attacking fromation with armoured engineers following up the lead Panthers and Tigers. As before, lighter tanks covered the flanks.With the Panzerglocke there would be a command group, including the Panther variant command tank, to control the armoured formation and supporting air strikes from Luftwaffe bombers and Ju 87 dive bombers.These new tactics depended upon certain criteria: adequate reconnaissance, good groud-to-air communication, high levels of tank gunnery, maintanance of momentum, correct positioning of Forward Observers, sufficient reserves of fuel and ammunition close to the attacking tip, and the correct use of white and coloured tank smoke for screening and marking of the battlefield.

The German Major-General F.W. von Mellenthin left an interesting record of the Pantherīs performance at Kursk in his book "Panzer Battles"." During Citadel armour moved and fought in wedge formation, the Panzerkeil, which up to then had proved very effective indeed.The spearhead of the wedge was formes by the heaviest tanks, and the Tigers proved their worth against the Pakfronts organised in depth. The Tigerīs 88 mm gun was superior to anything the Russianīs had, but as I have mentioned, the Panthers were still in their infancy and were a failure."

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