The Japanese had many problems with their naval technologies and doctrines that often are not readily apparent.
First, submarine defense / ASW formations was mentioned in this thread. The Japanese greatly under-rated the submarine as an offensive threat. Their own ASW capacity was limited. Their sonar systems were the rough equivalent of early war Allied ones and really never got better than that. Most of their destroyers had a limited fit of depth charge systems. Usually, this amounted to 2 Y guns and a rack or two on the stern. This compares badly with US or British practice of 6 K guns (3 per side) and two racks minimum. The British often went with 4 K guns per side.
One reason Kurta may have chosen the formation he was in was more for defense against PT boats and desroyers than submarines. In Japanese doctrine a primary role for submarines was scouting. They were rarely used in restricted waters so, by Japanese thinking the submarine threat would be perceived as minimal.
Even given a more 'German' submarine doctrine the Japanese would have eventually faced the same fate the Germans had befall them in the Atlantic. On the whole, it wouldn't have made that much difference, especially when you consider how much larger the Pacific is and, how much more room for maneuver the US had in routing convoys to various destinations.
On the Long Lance, the most common version had a 44,000 yard range and could make speeds up to 45 knots. This is somewhere between double and triple the best Allied torpedos of the war. The Japanese had an excellent torpedo doctrine and could reload their tubes on most ships for a second salvo while underway in a matter of a few minutes. This reload capacity was something Allied ships lacked.
On radar, the Japanese were handicapped more by limitations in manufacturing capacity than technology. By the end of 1943 they had surpassed the Germans at sea in radar and ESW technologies. Their 2 Go 2 Gata 4 Kai set surpassed anything the Germans produced in quantity as a fire control set (it's the two horn radar set seen on many surface ships).
They had search radars on larger ships as early as the end of 1942 but, there was never enough to go around. They also lacked the integration that a CIC system brought to US ships as well as the capacity to link radar inputs directly into their fire control systems. Both of these restrict the value radar has for the Japanese.
Another doctrinal shortcomming was in carrier operations. The Japanese doctrine was much poorer in terms of CAP control and usage. It also resulted in a slower cycle time for strike operations. At every carrier battle in the Pacific it cost them heavily.
By 1944 when it came down to a gun fight, the US was holding all the cards really. At Surigao Straight the Yamashiro never even knew what US BB's were firing on her or from where. She was blown out of the water at over 35,000 yards range.
The Japanese penchant for mulitple small fleets carrying out complex strategies, like the Midway operation, generally ended up as defeats in detail. This type of strategy at sea just didn't work and the Japanese never really adapted to the changing character of the Pacific war. That was probably their biggest failing.