Quote
__________________________________________________ ____________________________________

Anouther factor over looked by western history was the Russians would have invaded Japan if the US did not. The Russians took an island or two in the north and it is still Russian to this day.
That put pressure on the Japanese to find a way out of the war and put pressure on the allies to end the war in their favor instead of the Russians.
__________________________________________________ ____________________________________

Ive seen very good arguments for both sides of that proposition of the the Soviets invading Japan.

The Soviets made amphibious landings in the Kuril islands, Sakhalin island and North Korea, but they were very small compared to the enormous task force the U.S. was planning for Operation Olympic.

The combined Allied naval armada would have been the largest ever assembled, including forty-two aircraft carriers, twenty-four battleships, and four hundred destroyers and destroyer escorts. Fourteen U.S. divisions were scheduled to take part in the initial landings in what was going to be a gigantic blood bath.


By all accounts the Soviets were confident they could invade and Glantz seems to think that they had a good chance of invading Hokkaido, so I'd probably go along with that, but others have argued that it was beyond the Soviets amphibious capabilities.


Quote
__________________________________________________ __________________________________

The fact that the SU had just given the Japanese a mighty wallop in invading Manchuria (Op. August Storm, started the very day after Hiroshima) and wiping out the largest concentration of Japanese forces may have given the Japanese Government yet another slight incentive to reconsider surrender...
__________________________________________________ ____________________________________

yes,thats right, as I posted some Japanese sources have stated that the atomic bombings themselves weren't the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, they contend, it was not the American atomic attacks on August 6 and August 9, but the swift and devastating Soviet victories on the mainland in the week following Stalin's August 8 declaration of war that forced Hirohito's message of surrender on August 15, 1945 [without a Guarantee for the Emperor]. Certainly the fact of both enemies weighed into the decision, but it was more the fear of Soviet occupation that hastened imperialistic Japan's acceptance of defeat.