El Alamein:

One final, but key, factor affected the success of British deception plans. Earlier in the desert campaigns, Rommel had quite successfully used wireless intelligence to determine British plans. The commander of Rommel's wireless intelligence was Captain Alfred Seebohm, who had become quite good at determining the British order of battle, dispositions, and intentions. It is fitting that after the British learned of See-bohm's listening post, British wireless intelligence, the Y service, located it.32 On 10 July, an attack was planned on Seebohm's position on a small group of mounds called the "Hills of Jesus." The attack was successful, and most of the intelligence equipment was captured intact. Seebohm himself was mortally wounded and later died in Cairo.

The British learned much about how Rommel had been able to outfox them in previous battles from the equipment found at the Hills of Jesus. They identified areas of poor British wireless security and made changes.

Probably the biggest blow to Rommel's intelligence-collection ability was Seebohm's loss. Rommel replaced the equipment and again began wireless intelligence-collection, but according to Anthony Cave Brown in Bodyguard of Lies, without Seebohm's keen ear for the abnormal, Rommel was "vulnerable to wireless deception."33 Whether or not Seebohm would have detected British deception plans is debatable. What is not debatable is that intelligence played a large and critical role at the Battle of Alam Halfa.

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/engl...ug02/smith.asp

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