Quote:
Originally Posted by Seadog
There were less than 25,000 U.S. troops there. The best thing would have been to disband the filipino troops and help them set up guerrilla outfits. That would have saved probably 75,000 filipinos. If they had protect the PBYs and B-17s, they could have been used to ferry troops to safety in a large part. Any troops that could not be evacuated could have been sent to many of the over 7000 islands in the Phillipines. Small 15 man squads with filipino guides could have scattered and gone into hidding, with arrangements for eventual rescue. I would have also diverted all submarines and other vessels to as close as safe positions and ferried some troops out that way. The problem is that second sight is 20/20. MacArthur was too egotistical to accept that he could not hold out, and the government did not feel the threat high enough to rush supplies there.
The use of Bataan and Corrigidor and the Fort was folly. It delayed the access to the bay, but also was undefendable and made them a target. They also could not resupply. The pennisula was too wide to properly defend and the vast majority were uneducated, untrained local troops.
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By this late date, there were no PBY Catalina flying boats in the PI and all the remaining B-17's were in Australia as was MacArthur. The US submarines were being used in the far more important role of cutting the Japanese supply lines.
The original War Plan Orange III plan was envisioned to keep the Japanese out of Manilla Bay by Fillipino-American forces falling back onto Battan with ample food supplies and with the fortified islands used as the "cork in the bottle", keep out the Japanese Navy, to await the inevitable counterattack by the US Pacific Fleet.