Quote:
Originally Posted by Seadog
What needed to be done was ignored in 1941. They needed the supplies which MacArthur had requested and which were deferred in order to supply Europe. At the first sign of attack on Dec. 8, MacArthur should have realized the futility of his position and started evacuations. He had the gasoline to ferry them to other islands. He had no suitable aircraft and no anti-aircraft weapons. He had insufficient supplies and weapons. Most of the troops were using old Lee-Enfields. He was going against a superior force that had time, training, and equipment on their side. Trying to hold out was a ridiculous waste of people. It was only one of many examples of troops dying for lost cause. I suppose they figured on humanitarian treatment by the Japanese, but they were not prepared for so many POWs. The Japanese ignored the Geneva Convention with a strong antipathy for other races.
By disbanding the filipino forces, he would be able to save them and reserve supplies for the American troops. The majority of the filipinos troops spoke several languages, while the officers spoke other languages, and the Americans only spoke English. Communications were almost nil. Evacuation by sub could have been given enough priority to save quite a few soldiers.
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Actually, MacArthur probably saw himself in an advantageous postion. He could not have foreseen the destruction and overunning of the Dutch and British Forces on his western flank by the Japanese, nor could he have predicted the massive destruction at Pearl Harbor and the subsequent closing of the vital sea supply lanes. As it was, he had the nucleus of a very large and capable army, airforce and navy already at his command. The one thing that he lacked was the time needed to knit it all together.
MacArthur had planned that the Japanese wouldn't attack until after the end of the Rainy Season, sometime in the late Spring of 1942, whereby he would have already been massively reinforced by numerous supply and troop convoys from the United States.
Perhaps this explains why he abandoned the strictures of WPO-3 (War Plan Orange-3 and decided to initially take the offensive against the invading Japanese troops with his partially constituted army.
Re: Aircraft. The P-40 B and P-40 E were capable and durable aircraft that were in many ways were the equal of their Japanese counterparts. These were the planes of the much vaunted AVG "Flying Tigers" of China, who fought the Japanese Navy and Army Aircraft there to a standstill. The Boeing B-17's based in the Philippines had no Japanese bomber counterpart worth talking about or even comparing with.
Re: AAA. The 3-inch, 75mm anti-aircraft gun was an effective, accurate weapon for its day. However, at the outset of war it was still working with old, outdated, ammunition. Once the newer, mechanically fused shells were rushed to the Philippines by sumarine, it's effective blast ceiling was raised by some several hundred additional feet, making the bombing by Japanese horizontal bombers a hazardous proposition.
Re: Philippine languages. The primary language on Luzon was and is Tagalog with English holding a strong second for both officers and enlisted men.
Re: The superiority in numbers of the Japanese. I don't believe that at any time during the Luzon campaign did the Japanese Army enjoy this advantage.
Re: The Lee Enfield Rifle. The Lee Enfield was an excellent bolt action rifle. Sgt York used one to kill and capture all of those Germans during WW I.
Re: Lack of supplies. MacArthur had massive quartermaster supply depots on the plains north of Clark Field. It has been calculated that there were enough foodstuffs, ammunition and equipment there to supply his army for over a years time in the field. What he did not have was the transportation means to move them all into Bataan once WPOIII had again put into effect.