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If the US is assumed to be at war with Germany and Britain et al., are still actively fighting even after the British Isles are occupied, then the US remains a viable threat to Germany. One can assume in such a case the US would have made Japan the primary target and defeated that nation by late 1944 or early 1945. The following are also reasonable assumptions based on historical data
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I agree that Japan would become the primary focus of the American war effort, but cannot concur that they would/could have been beaten by 1944 or 1945. Firstly, the Americans wouldn’t have had the use of bases in India (not an issue for direct military action but it was for the American supplying China, and tying up troops in Burma). The Japanese could have redeployed these troops in Burma elsewhere. If at this early stage the Japanese were seen to be winning, the nationalists movements in Burma, Thailand and even possibly India, would have quite happy to run Vichy-style governments.
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The US would have continued to expand their military into 1945 having as many as 200+ divisions available. The US Navy would be the same gigantic force it originally was meaning that Germany is essentially powerless to stop an Atlantic crossing or inflict any meaningful casualties on such an operation using seapower. The US would also have sufficent carrier forces by that point to reasonably challenge what Luftwaffe forces might be present.
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Again I agree that the US would have become a massive force but disagree that the Germans would have been powerless against them. Firstly, one has to assume that the losses incurred by the US in the Pacific were equal to the real situation. Therefore, one assumes that they are then transferred to the Atlantic and then have to cross it with ALL their needs enshipped aboard. Considering the problems that the Allies had with their supply network after DDAy, WITH a land base (Britain), I cannot see how they would have been able to accomplish this operation without severe problems. The invasion of Britain and or Europe would not be the same as island invasions on the Pacific. The requirements in manpower, equipment, supplies and defence would be tens, if not hundreds, times greater. All this would require being shipped across the Atlantic. And there would be no need for the German U-boats to have cross-Atlantic capabilities. A screen at their usual operational limit would have been sufficient to score major successes. And if the US Navy’s only major experience of counter-submarine operations had been the Pacific, the u-boat threat would have been a big surprise. The Japanese submarine threat was pathetic in comparison. If anything, the escort requirements would have been higher – protecting aircraft carriers is a big enterprise than food or even troop convoys (and for an invasion the initial troop convoy concentration would have been much greater).
With Britain out the war, the Germans would have been operating from Britain, Norway, and North Africa. For the Americans to incapacitate the u-boat, and to a degree the surface ship threat, they would have had to disrupt these bases as well. How would they have done that – just with carrier-borne aircraft?
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The Germans would be far less aware of US intentions and operations than the Allies would be of German dispositions. Germany had no spy network in the US while one can reasonably expect a large and active one in German occupied nations.
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I can’t see how this would have worked or helped much. Firstly, all of the OSS activities in occupied Europe were centred in Britain. Secondly, spying on the ground contributed very little to the war effort, in any meaningful way. Thirdly, most of the intelligence gathered was through Enigma interceptions and decodes – something that the Americans were very poor at and didn’t get to grips with until the British provided their know-how.
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The Germans would also certainly get hit with nuclear bombs at some point. This would likely be another rude shock far beyond some of the ones like use of Window or H2S were. Since Japan would almost certainly fall before nuclear weapons were available the surprise would be complete. The US could have used a B-36 or B-29 out of Iceland to deliver such a weapon. It is very unlikely that Germany could mount an invasion of this island given its defenses which would, no doubt, have been beefed up following the fall of Britain. It is simply that the Germans lack naval power and the amphibious capacity to carry out such an operation.
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As I said in a previous post, I doubt that the Germans would have left Iceland unoccupied. And the occupation of Iceland by the Americans occurred in the summer 1941, taking over from the British. So, if Britain had fallen, it would have been a race to who could occupy it first. Thus, who would have down the “beefing up” of the defences?
And to occupy Iceland (with the minimal defences that existed upto the US occupation in 1941), the Germans wouldn’t have needed a major amphibious occupation. An airborne one would have sufficed, with naval support.
The use of nuclear bombs will always be supposition.
Thus any use of it by the Americans would have required them to occupy a base close to Europe first. Surely any attempt on Iceland, even for this sole purpose, would have been an early warning to the Germans to some sort threat?
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Another problem for the Germans is that the Allies could begin their own "U-boat" campaign against German shipping, such as it was. This could cause serious problems supplying their forces in Britain. Again, the lack of naval power by Germany is going to be a severe handicap to their challenging Allied naval operations.....And, the Luftwaffe is no substitute.
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The same problem that you outlined for the German subs operating so far from their bases is applicable here for Allied subs.
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On that last, let's just say the US shows up with a 5 to 7 division amphibious assault with say 200+ warships in tow. If we assume the Luftwaffe has say, 200 to 300 aircraft in Britain immediately available for use how long would they last?
I would speculate based on US operations off Okinawa that the Germans would lose air superiority within a week after which they could mount the occasional strike with substancial losses. Off Okinawa the Japanese threw almost 5000 aircraft (mostly in suicide missions) against the US barely making a dent in their naval operations.
A couple hundred aircraft not trained in anti-shipping operations could hardly be expected to do much at all.
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That extrapolation from the experiences on Okinawa doesn’t stand up. By the time that Okinawa was invaded, the Japanese air force had been decimated, with most of their experienced fliers dead. For the Germans to be in that position, they would have had to have had their air force decimated on the Russian front – there is no evidence that they ever got to that stage solely in the East. Their major air losses, and the decimation of their experienced units occurred almost entirely on the western front.
And you are assuming that German air defences would have been used mainly in anti-shipping operations. I wager that the Germans would probably have used it at the invasion stage – do more damage to the carrier based aircraft (and I reiterate that the Americans would have been reliant almost completely on carrier aircraft), and inflict more damage to disembarking troops.
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The problem here for the Germans is that fighting a war in an occupied Britain is first and foremost a naval operation something they are virtually incapable of sustaining.
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Could you explain what you mean by that