OKH refused adequate troops and equipment to complete the conquest of North Africa, citing needs in elsewhere such as Russia. Using my 20/20 hindsight, it becomes obvious that not supporting the DAK with sufficient troops was a colossal mistake that affected the war adversely for the Wehrmacht far out of proportion to its importance to the German war effort.

Had OKH sent the requested divisions and supplies early (Mar 1941) when requested by Rommel, then most likely North Africa could have secured, as the British situation was problematic at best. A large number of the desert fighters that had embarrassed Graziani's Italians in 1940 were either PoWs or had lost their equipment in the futile defense of Greece and Crete. OKH wanted Rommel to conduct a defensive campaign, but Rommel refused, choosing instead to attack as soon as the 15th Panzer was unloaded. He did not wait for the follow-on units to arrive. The effect that the extra men and equipment requested by DAK but denied by Herr Schnicklgruber can be appreciated by the magnitude of the defeat endured by the UK forces, resulting in the capture of Generals Neame and O'Connor.

However, the surges to the Sinai by the DAK in Spring 1941 and Autumn 1942 was not be because of the urgent needs on the Eastern Front. Very likely, after the conquest of North Africa, the Germans could have defended both ends of the Med Sea with about 8-10 divisions. As it was, they lost North Africa and was forced to defend the southern coasts of Europe to the tune of about 40 divisions, exacerbating the manpower crisis that plagued the Eastern Front from late 1943 on. Can you imagine what a difference 30 or divisions would have made in July 1944, when Army Group Center disintergrated? And to add insult to injury, Hitler belatedly ordered the numbers of divisons requested by Rommel after he had left, just in time for von Arnim to surrender them in May 1943. This loss of men was on the magnitude of Stalingrad, though not quite as large. At least most of these PoWs came home after the war, in contrast to the poor souls hung out to dry with Paulus.

So, in the end, the refusal to provide adequate troops, saving them for Russia, ended up tying up far more troops later than were saved in the beginning.

I have no idea if Rommel could see the situation as it was to play out, but he fully understood that going onto the defence as OKH wanted him to do was a plan fraught with problems that would only result in German defeat in North Africa. He dove into the fight straight up using the German Army's usual disdain for logistical considerations. But he had no choice.

The German losses in North Africa were felt for the remainder of the war and were critical, both in men lost and men tied up defending the huge Southern European coastline.

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Best Regards,
JW