I've done a bit of reading on French mobilization and offensive pans for 1939, and... they were slow.

From mobilization.
2d week: clear the German outposts from th border (the historical Saar offensive)

4th week: advance to the Siegfried Line, clearing its outworks. Historical note: in 1939 this consisted of a couple trenches and barricades on the roads.

6 to 10th weeks: methodically attack the Siegfried Line with the objects of destroying any enemy that stand and fight, rupturing the defense zone, then clearing enough to allow advance up the west bank of the Rhine.

12+ weeks: Advance to the Rhur with the object of closing industrial transport route on the Rhine & adjacent rivers, capture the Rhur on the west bank, threaten the industrial cites on the east bank with artillery & air attack, prepare to assualt across the Rhine.

As we know the Polish army was destroyed before the French mobilization progressed to the second attack phase.

Assuming the French had a similar offensive plan a year earlier in 1938 the Cezchs would need to hold out a minimum of four weeks before French pressure became apparent. Of course there may have been other mobilization/attack plans, but I'm not aware of them.

The Cezchs had two "Fast Divsions" which had most of their tanks, and all the artillery, and supply motorized. The rifle strength was mostly horse mounted (like the German 'Light Divsion') with the heavy infantry weapons motorized. They also had some bits in their first line infantry divsions motorized, like the Germans.

The Cezchs had AT guns and artillery equal to the Germans and were well trained.

The Cezchs had a difficult stratigic situation. The Germans could flank their fortified zone of The Bohemian/Studentland hills through Austria. While this would have taken many days of a week or two to accomplish it would have meant a mobile battle with motorized, armored, and cavalry forces (The Germans had two horse cavalry divsions as front line units in 1938) on the rolling hills decending from Ausria to the central Bohemian plain where Prague sits.

The second stratigic problem is the Polish frontier. The Cezch have a very long frontier and many mountain passes to defend. The Polish national objective was the capture of some border towns with Polish populations and economic links to Poland. Of course the Poles may have taken more, rather than leave extra bits for the Germans.

The German problems are a serious shortage of artillery & ammo, the armored & motor rifle divsions are only half trained the Luftwaffe is less than half trained and lacks a lot of support & spare parts. Their stratigic dellima is that they must concentrate to crush the Cezch army, but also defend the Rhinelan/Ruhr. On paper the Wehrmacht could do this, but in the field there were to many partially trained and equipped units.

The possible mobile battles intrigue me. Manuvering the pygmy tanks of 1938 about Bohemia or the Rhineland, the cute older planes in the sky, the funky 1930s uniforms...and horse cavalry galloping about. And I see all sides making a lot of mistakes as they flail about attempting to learn the new mobile warfare.