Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger

"Read the post above yours, and do not forget about the heavy minefileds laid exactly for that eventuality."

Aside from the mines fields there is the problem of trying to navigate shallow waters at night. Its extremely unikely the Germans will have a pilot who is up to date on the currents and shoals of the Thames estuary. Also the Brits begain altering and concealing the navigation aids near the entry to hinder German submarines in placing mines. If the battleships dont hit mines they are likely to ground on a mud bank.

Night wont be a lot of concealment anyway. The Brits had standing ASW patrols on the approaches to their harbors watching for mine layers. I also vaguely recall coastal batterys covering the Thames. Their lookouts and searchlights might be added to the German approach problem.

I'd send the capitol ships out singly or in pairs on quick raids to catch and hopefully panic a convoy. The best defensive tactic when battleships or crusiers came into range of a convoy was for the cargo ships to scatter, so only a few could be pursued & sunk. Od course individual ships are more vulnerable to sumbarines or air attack. So, by having a sub pack in position and a bomber group on standby a repeat of PQ17 might occur.

Another trick might be for the Luftwaffe to attack the escourting battleship a day before the German ships are expected to make contact. Its unlikely they will sink it. But, a torpedo hit or a hit on a turret or radar mast would place the Brits ship at a disadvantage in a surface encounter.

The overall result of this would be a intolerable strain on the British escourt system. I suspect the German Adm Raeder intended something like this when he begain rebasing the German ships to the French Atlantic ports. As it was Goering did not want to cooperate with a necessary level of air reconissance and bomber support, and Donetz thought it better for the submarines to operate indenpendant of the surface ships.