I personally take the view that that the US positions in Corregidor and Bataan could be held successfully. But several things have to happen in order for the defense to be successful.

The parallel I cite is Guadalcanal. US forces there won control of the air and persisted to run Navy convoys to the island despite heavy losses. In a chapter of the Marine general's memoirs, he mentioned the parallelism of Bataan and Guadalcanal. Because of US persistence, that island gradually sapped Japanese strength.

In Corregidor and Bataan, the opposite happened. The reinforcements and supplies for these posts never arrived or were diverted to Australia. These positions were written off as lost in the minds of the planners in Washington.

My friends wargamed this several times and usually, the Japanese commander won if we stuck to historical events.

If US aircraft had survived the December 8 bombing of Clark Field and planners took the risk of deploying their carriers to support the early relief of the Bataan and Corregidor garrisons, these positions could've been held in 1942. Luzon, in effect would have been transformed into magnet to divert Japanese forces from other operations in Southeast Asia.

SOmething like the Coastwatchers organization could've been in use in the other smaller Philippine islands, allowing whatever US aircraft available to pounce on approaching Japanese naval formations.

As for the quality of the Filipino troops, the Philippine Scouts Division, which was a regular US Army formation, was first rate. The other 10 Philippine divisions were iffy because they were just newly formed. But war is a Darwinian process and had the US persisted, it was just possible that the troops that survived in the initial clashes would've had the time to be bloodied and toughened to a point that would've further bolstered the defense of Corregidor and Bataan.

A little trivia: the last mounted US Cavalry charge was made during the defense of Bataan. If I remember correctly, it was at the Battle of the Points.