Quote:
Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
I doubt Allied code breaking had a role in it. This was still in its infancy and Benchley Park was not reading every message nor were they really able to "real time" results.
On the other hand had Crete held it would have had interesting possibilities for the air war. The Allies would have now possessed a site sufficently far forward to launch bomber strikes on Polesti regularly. This would have seriously hurt the Germans. As it was bombing Polesti was difficult due to the length of the flight and terrain over which the bombers had to travel. A closer base means a shorter flight and heavier bombload.
Could have been a real danger to the German war machine.
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Correct. There are pleanty of good books concerning ULTRA & they make it clear the Enigma derived intellegence had good stratigic value in 1941, but limited operational or tactical utility. I think in this case other British signals intellegence is being confused with Enigma intercepts. Ordinary radio traffic analysis gave the Britsh the key information for negating suprise.