Quote:
Originally Posted by jean2005
Little question, there were told by here, that Zhukov tried to convice Stalin to retreat from Kiev, where is this information from? (I dont know it, but I want to know it, and no one here had reffered some sources)
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Jean2005
You menton yourself earlier that Zhukov was responsible for Kievīs loss? What is your source on that?
See your text earlier:
"Maybe he warned before Kiev, maybe not, but true is, that he is responsible for that (lost) battle."
To me it seems it was Stalin, again.
September 9, 1941
Marshal Budyenny, commanding an Army in the Kiev area, makes his first request to abandon Keiv. Stalin denies the request.
September 11, 1941
General Budyenny makes his second appeal to Stalin to withdraw from the Kiev area. This time the the request was co-signed by the ranking commissar, Nikita Krushchev. Budyenny was sacked within hours. Only 60 miles separated the jaws of the great German encirclement at Kiev.
September 16, 1941
The Kiev pocket begins to collapse as Soviet forces begin to withdraw. General Timoshenko, commander of the Soviet High Command (STAVKA), authorizes the withdrawal. However, Stalin would not confirm the orders for 48 critical hours.
September 17, 1941
The withdrawal from the Kiev pocket is finally approved by Stalin, but it is far too late. General Kirponos, commander of the forces in Kiev, would share the fate of many of his soldiers when his column, attempting to withdraw was ambushed and he was cut down. In the end, only 15,000 would escape the encirclement. This was a grave blow to the Red Army.
http://www.bartcop.com/arc4109.htm
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On the other hand on the other major losses on the Ostfront earlier for the Red Army. If you read "Stalinīs folly" by by Constantine Pleshakov it gives rather a good picture, which I could believe, that very soon into the Barbarossa Stalin and Stavka realized the troops close to border were necessary to sacrifice in order to be able to create a new defensive line deep into USSR soil. New troops were created and sent there while it was hoped the troops sacrficed could buy the time for the Red Army to prepare for the Germans. However the Germans were much faster than hoped for and their tactics at the time better. And Zhukov had to fight Stalin all the time with making decisions on the tactics, the best example still being the major winter attack that Stalin wanted to take place all through the front and not as a concentrated attack.
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Also I find the reaction for Glantzīs book a bit stupid. It must be only the name that shocks people. If all in all the book tells the story where AGC was almost ripped off its pedestal Iīd say it was a great Red Army story even if the losses were huge. If the name was something like " Zhukov the almost-destroyer of the AGC and Model" we would get a very different reaction. I say I find it funny that some book reviews on the book in Amazon claim that he is troubled by how pro-Soviet Glantz is in his book. And I say that if you have read the book you agree. And i agree. And it is a great book on how close the Red Army was to win the war in Dec 1942! You either accept the losses or not. But thatīs how Zhukov played his game.