This is speaking of Midway, but goes pretty much the same for Guadalcanal.
"The defects in this strategy were numerous. The Japanese fleet could not reasonably expect either to hold Midway or operate aircraft from its runways inasmuch as the U.S, Seventh Air Force in Hawaii could easily destroy the exposed site with one high level raid by B-17 Flying Fortresses. And Yamamotos belief that the Japanese carriers could again close on Hawaii - now defended by constant long range patrolling, early warning radars, and an immense concentration of land based fighters and fighter-bombers - betrayed not only another sorry feature of Japanese military intelligence, but also the admiral's inability to make reasoned strategic calculations.
........
The most optimistic prewar Japanese policy envisioned a violent series of successful early blows followed by a negotiated compromise with Britain and the U.S.- by early April 42 the foreign minister, worried that the Japanese forces were overextended, began to urge the Germans to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union so as to allow the Axis to concentrate against the English speaking Allies.
........
The Naval General Staff was locked in a struggle with Admiral Yamamoto, who proposed another daring thrust by the combined fleet into the Eastern Pacific, to assault the Hawaii - Midway line. At the height of Japans power, none of these authorities made a move to exploit their military success and explore a negotiated settlement - one more lapse in Tokyo's conduct of the war.
.......
Rather than exploit strength either via diplomacy or by adopting a more robust defensive strategy, Japans leaders chose to mount two risky offensives.

Which became Coral Sea & Midway.

War in the Pacific, Daniel Marston

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Morbius, Morbius! Something is approaching from the Southwest. It is now quite close.