Quote:
Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
The problem for the Japanese in all of this is that their expectations of how the Pacific war would be fought was based on their capacity for and doctrines of combat. That is, they had no clue that the US would send as an initial landing force over 20,000 troops to Guadalcanal. Instead, their thinking was that this was another Mankin Atoll raid. In their view the later incident was within their expected norms of warfare, Guadalcanal wasn't.
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I have to admit that I never thought to look at the Guadalcanal situation that way. Your post clearly gives an explanation on why the Japanese sent reinforcements in a piecemeal fashion.
Going by your explanation, it indicates that had the Japanese reacted more efficiently during the early stage of the Guadalcanal campaign before the Marines had fully dug in, the Japanese could have given the US a knockout punch.
So a new question crops up. Did the Japanese have the available resources to mount a massive reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal at the moment of the Marines' vulnerability?
I think it's possible because the Navy did leave the Marines vulnerable for a period of time.