The Japanese opportunity would have been in the first few hours. As the intial serials of Marines crossed the lagoon a greater concentration of fire power could have attritioned enough to weaken the eventual enclave along the seawall. Bringing reinforcements to the bunkers and trenches might increase the firepower to the tipping point. Then a counter attack, or a series of counter attacks to kill off the Marines along and across the seawall. The second landing occured later in the morning and was isolated from the first beachhead for many hours. The smaller second group would have had much more trouble advancing alone, and been more vulnerable to counter attack in the afternoon.

The breakdown in shore to ship communications aided the Japanese. Unfortunatly their communications fell apart as well. The status of the Japanese commander is not clear. Post battle analysis suggests he may have been killed at his CP by a lucky shot during the preliminary USN fires, or while moving along a communications trench as the first wave of Marines came in. The loss of the commander & possibly the CP staff would explain the lack of any Japanese counter attacks of noticeable size during the morining and early afternoon.