Quote:
Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger
The Japanese opportunity would have been in the first few hours. As the intial serials of Marines crossed the lagoon a greater concentration of fire power could have attritioned enough to weaken the eventual enclave along the seawall. Bringing reinforcements to the bunkers and trenches might increase the firepower to the tipping point. Then a counter attack, or a series of counter attacks to kill off the Marines along and across the seawall. The second landing occured later in the morning and was isolated from the first beachhead for many hours. The smaller second group would have had much more trouble advancing alone, and been more vulnerable to counter attack in the afternoon.
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I fully concur with this one. From what I've read on amphib ops in World War II, the landing force is generally most vulnerable in the first few hours of the assault, even with heavy naval and air support. It really depends on the ability of defending force to react properly.
The case of Tarawa brings to mind the Japanese landings on Wake. Like Tarawa, the US could've chosen to contest the island. However, the main question is: do the defenders have any forces available to do this?
generally, Amphib ops rely on surprise. Once surprise is achieved, it becomes very difficult for the defenders to stop the landings.