FramerT and Seadog.

Now you are discussing doctrine not the armour in question. By Kursk the 'Panzerkiel' tactic was obsolete. No tank was built to break-through 22,000 km of trenches.

Seadog. Infantry support is not ideal use of armour. Integrated combined-arms fighting calls for combined-arms formations. In Normandy the first (Commonwealth/British)operations, and the infamous Goodwood, saw the tanks operate without their infantry to conserve manpower. A horrible failiure. By Bluecoat the Armoured divisions were fighting with a mixture of 1:1. 1 infantry battallion and one armoured regiment. A battlewinning recepie.

The 8th Army had deviced a special break-in formation that worked very well in the desert. (can be produced if you want to) But after that formation came the independant tank brigade. This system did not work in Normandy, since the allies were constantly running into kampfgruppen and other units before manouvre was possible.

FramerT

[The 'toughest' defence line the Allies faced was a makeshift West Wall. IMO, breaking
through the opponents front and taking out his artillery and communications would come before supporting the infantry.[/quote]

A tank is blind as a bat and deaf as a pole. It cannot negotiate rough terrain and spot entrenched AT-guns, Minefields, AT-Infantry and other tanks.

The result of using the Tank as you describe is evident in Goodwood.

__________________
'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942