Quote:
Originally Posted by Kai-Petri
At least quite a demandind operation...
For troops having previously gone through one invasion like the Torch sounds like a bit too tough cookie to go for next. (Then again the US were wanting an invasion in France 1943 already in the real world...).
Ok, but first youŽd need to have the troops figured that land, how much ships you had in use ( landing craft etc ) at the moment, what youŽd need to do to bomb the railways around the landing areas etc. And also what would you do with Corsica and Sardinia. Also youŽd need to think at that point about the Italian navy as well.
If you could get the Italians on your side secretly they could help with the Venice landing without German interference, but thatŽs another story.
|
The landings in Sicily were the largest amphibious operation ever. Patch's landings at the Riviera were equally large in terms of ships required, etc. The Allies had the shipping tonnage necessary to make the landings I suggest. The Italian Navy was non-existent at this point in the war. Corsica and Sardinia were lightly defended and had no air or naval bases of any consequence.
Bombing anywhere near the two landing zones would not have been wise. These landings would have been a complete surprise. Two phony campaigns could have been set up as was done prior to the Normandy landings when Hitler was made to believe that Calais was the intended target of DDAY. For the Venice landings, the phony operation could make Hitler believe that Albania was the intended target and the purpose of the invasion was to link up with Tito's forces in Yugoslavia (where 25 divisions were fighting 25 German divisions on more or less equal terms). For the Monaco landings the phony operation could make Hitler believe that the intended target was the Riviera.
Given the centralized command and control of the German military, with all major decisions going through Hitler, making Hitler believe that the Monaco and Venice landings were "diversions", as he believed concerning the Normandy campaign would have been more important to the Allies than bombing the railways around Monaco and Venice. What you really want to bomb are the railways heading toward the Riviera from further north in France, and the railways which cross the rough terrain in Austria on their way to Italy.
The Allies had the shipping, the airpower, and the men to launch this enterprise, what they lacked was audacity. The biggest mistake that the Allies made in WWII was putting Eisenhower in charge instead of Patton. And then the mistake was compounded by Eisenhower's insistence on doing what was politically expedient instead of what was militarily expedient and letting Montgomery develop the Italian campaign plans instead of giving that job to Patton.
For a military person to purposely choose to have the Allied forces slog from south to north down the Italian peninsula with natural defensive barriers running east to west every few miles was idiocy. Marshall should have cashiered whoever presented that plan on the spot.
The Italian Inchon campaign would have worked and worked marvelously.