A few more points.

The Corps HQ did not keep the HQ of the 106th adaquately informed of events to either flank. It was not until a regiment of the 28th Divsion made direct contact with the 106th and reported that it was out of contact with the rest of the 28th, that the overall situation became clearer. Neither did the 106th have a adaquate grasp of when promised reinforcements would arrive, or their quantity. It was known the 9th Armored Div was in 1st Army reserve, and the fact of its release from reserve was made known to the 106th. But, the actual size of the reinforcements sent (one combat command) and time of arrival were not well defined.

When a second armored combat commad of the 7th Armored Divsion arrived the commander of the 106th was not yet cognizant of the true situation. He planned and started execution of a relief of the two surrounded regiments with the two armored CCs. This failed and left the surrounded group in a worse position. They had been ordered to attack west out of the Schnee Eifel to link with the relief force. This left them concentrated on several hillsides exposed to the German columns on a main road. Fo lack of trucks they had to abandon most of their personal equipment, stoves & fuel, remaining rations, ammo that could not be carried, the regimental cannon companys, a antiaircraft battery, AT guns, and most imporotant they abandoned the shelters and bunkers the 2d Divsion had built. Had they remained in the original defensive positions air supply may have been possible (a air supply effort was ordered by 1st Army, but never executed). Their original defensive positions were not in the path of the German mechanized columns or threatening the German supply routes, so efforts to reduce the pocket would have been weakend by higher priorities elswhere.

I am guessing the more experinced commander and staff of the 2d Divsion would have grasped the situation better, probablly realizing the difficulty in trying to relieve the stranded regiments. While I cant say if they would have held out through the entire battle like the 101st they would have had a better chance tucked away in bunkers in the forrested hills.

The 2d probablly would have executed a better artillery fire support during the critical opening hours of the battle. The inexperince 10th divsion cmd & artillery cmd staffs did not catch on fast enough what the battalion comanders needed in the first few hours.

One other difference might have been the attached battalions. The 2d Div usually had a independant tank battalion and a Tank Destroyer battalion attached. I'm not sure that was the case when the 2d was relieved by the 106th. But, tanks & tank destroyers are not mentioned in accounts of the 106ths battle. They were present with the 2d when it fought further north along the Elseborn Ridge area.

The commander of the 106th died of heart failure shortly after the relief effort failed to advance. The 1st Army commander had already endorsed the corps commanders request to replace him.

The remainder of the 106th fought through the rest of the Bulge battle, ending in january just a few miles from its original starting point. After taking replacements in Febuary it was assigned in March to expand and guard POW camps for the wave of surrendering German soldiers that were headed west into France.