Quote:
Originally Posted by von Rundstedt
Hey Sloniksp
Thank you for the insight of General Gotthard Heinrici, i would be very interested in knowing his top 7, where can i get such information.
Thank you.
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Here you go, I actually posted them here in here before so I just copy and paste
Oh and I believe #4 was what you might have been referring too
From "Before Stalingrad" - David Glantz
General Gotthard Heinrici, commander of the German Fourth Army's XXXXII Arrmy Corps at Moscow and by wars end the Wehrmacht's premier defensive specialist, congently assessed the reason for the German failure even before the Red Army's Moscow counteroffensive began, stating:
The goal set for the Eastern Campaing was not achieved. The enemy's armed forces were defeated, but the Russian state structure did not collapse. The threat of a two front war stood at the door. The attack on Russia did not prevent this from happening; on the contrary, it conjured up its possibility.
The basis for this failure rested on the following:
1. Politically, Hitler underestimated the inner stability or the Bolshevik system. It proved to be tenacious and consolidated. The spirit within the Russians to defend 'Mother Russia' was stronger than their rejection of the Communist dictatorship.
2. Economically, Russia was also better established than Hitler was willing to admit.
3. Militarily, the Russian armed forces were surprisingly capable. They often defended with a stubborn tenacity and they had an astounding ability to improvise, even in the technical arena. These qualities consistently made up for the inability of the senior Russian leadership.
4. Most decisive was the operational decision of August 1941, which shifted the main emphasis of the operation from Army Groupe Centre to Army Group South and in part, to the north. This forfeited the best chance to conduct a decisive battle with the enemy during the direct attack on Moscow. I stress 'best chance ,' because there has been no evidence to the contrary.
5. The motorized problem must also be considered. The German Army did not have the necessary motorized units and air transport formations or the required fuel reserves for a campaign in an area with the depth of Russia.
6. The width and depth of Russia had a decisive significance.
7. The Russian climate and terrain also complicated matters. The effect of the mud period was surprising in its significance. The coming of the Russian winter did not correspond with German expectations. And the difficulty of the terrain, with its wide marshes and impasssible regions, the great primeval-like forests complexes, the few good roads and the wide, unregulated river courses may not have stopped the offensive, but they did cause considerable delays.