Limited success/limited failure, sure I could accept that, but to what purpose if the end result is more or less the same? What would it prove? If anything, the pull-out would have been even more demoralizing.

Again, I think the problem with this analysis is the common post-war assumption that the Allies knew then what they were up against. To the contrary, there's much more evidence to suggest they had no idea, only the vaguest of clues at best. This may have stemmed from the fact that Gen. Gamelin made some wild over-estimations of Germany's forces, but once again this goes back to faulty intelligence. I would again state that in order to mount such a concerted push would have required a change in doctrinal thinking, something which they were not about to do. Sure, people like then Col. de Gaulle had their ideas, and pressured both the military and government to adopt them, but his wish would come true only during the dark days of the 1940 Blitz.

Lets also not forget that in order for such a massive armored thrust into Germany to be successful, communications at a tactical level between armor/infantry and aircraft would have to have been very good, though in reality it was generally quite poor and antiquated, perhaps sporadic at best. Communication was horrible in practice during the defensive fight in 1940, how could it have been any better for an offense through forested hills?

I would also like to point out a few French publications which I have documenting French regimental histories involved in the Saar offensive, explaining in good detail that while the average French soldier was actually excited in entering Germany, many were complaining of the lack of modern equipment, modern weapons, and at being held in positions at length until mortars or light artillery could be brought up (per WW 1 rule). While their immediate superiors were very wise and able commander, the rear echelon commander had very liitle idea of what was really happening.

Of particular interest, in Alain Legrand's-Alain leBerre's "La Bretagne a l'epreuve - Sarre,Flandres, Dunkerque" (record of the French regiments from Britanny region, notable the 137e R.I., but also the 65e and 62e R.I.), many men were injured and killed during the first days of the Sarre offensive by minefields, all divisions and regiments involved not having a single working mine detector among them. They rarely had reliable information coming from their adjacent regiments, the 65e and 62e R.I.s. Almost all of these regiments began their advance uphill, through thick woods. Elements of the 48e R.I. were bogged down in the forest by their heavy coats and old gear which were all soaking wet, so they were ordered to dig first foxholes, then trenches for the night!
(pgs. 67 through 98).


Another good work, "8 Septembre, 1939 - Cette Nuit Nous entrons en Allemagne" by Bertrand Le Barillec details almost exclusively the 137e R.I. perspective. These men, mainly 1st Batt. captured Gersheim, are bombed by their own reconnaissance planes, ambushed by a German patrol, attack after them through thick woods with fixed bayonets only to get tangled in the underbrush and thickets. ( pgs. 105-133.)

Not only did the French have no idea of the opposing forces, they didn't even have a clue about the terrain on which they were fighting.

A few small towns and villages were captured, good for propaganda purposes, and there were several sharp skirmishes and many casualties from mines and booby-traps (including one unfortunate casualty who had his old 1886/93 Lebel rifle explode in his hands from the cartridges in the tubular magazine). However, I think it's safe to conclude that a large scale thrust would have suffered the same defficiencies, only on a much larger scale. The French may have captured some more territory, and the Germans probably would have answered by diverting some of their men, armor and airpower to the region, but I seriously doubt that the outcome would have been any different, and Poland would still have fallen.

I would argue that after Sept. 1st-1939, the Allies could not have done anything to save the Poles, their fate being sealed by the Non-Aggression pact between Germany and the USSR signed on the eve of war.