Yes, this is true, but we knew this only after the fact. Did the French know this at the time in 1939, no they didn't. If they had known, then perhaps they may have made a concerted effort to beakout from the Saarland, but the fact remains they had very little reliable information to warrant attacking a fortified area, one which they believed at the time was very strong, which is why I stated earlier, "for all the French knew, the Seigfreid Line was just as intensive and formidable as the Maginot Line".

My argument here, is simply that we cannot take post-war knowledge and apply it to the past, then place fault and blame on certain parties for not doing/knowing any better. 20/20 hindsight can only be played so far.

If I were to fault the French commanders for anything, it was not taking care of themselves first. We sometimes forget that the Maginot Line, as originally intended, was to run clear into Belgium and connect with Eben Emael. As the French were looking for historical evidence to take all precautions into account, they should have known (and remembered) that in WW 1 the Dutch and Belgians were also neutral when the Germans attacked. Because of this, the French should have NEVER asked the Dutch and Belgians for mutual assistance and co-operation in military planning. It was very clear that Holland and Belgium did not want to antagonize Hitler by joining in defense planning with France. Once this was made clear, the French should have simply continued the Maginot along the Franco-Belgian border all the way to the Channel, even if that did antagonize the Belgians (granted, there was concern of pushing segments of Dutch and Belgian population further into the German camp by doing this, especially the Flemish-speaking regions). Still, Dutch and especially Belgian neutrality left northen France dangerously exposed. Would it have made a difference in 1939 for Poland? Probably not, but in 1940 it could have made a big difference to the French.

Sorry, but I disagree. The problems of the 1930s did play a huge role in the wide politico-varietal and extremists attitude of the French populace, one which would affect the government and military alike in many ways. I think it is wrong to ignore this aspect. Nor do I think the "old foggies' were so non-chalant about the Germans taking Poland. The French (and British) agreement with Poland was to declare war on Germany if Poland was invaded. As for saving Poland, I think most concluded it was logistically a near impossibility, especially once the Russians were in the fray. If Poland was of no concern, then the French could have simply not honored their agreement with Poland, not declare war on Germany, and be done with it right then and there!

Secondly, I would not at all be surprised if many in the French government believed that the Non-Aggression pact between Germany and the USSR also meant that Stalin would aid Hitler in the event of a French incursion into Germany (not too far from the truth either, considering that much of the oil, fuel, and raw materiel used by the Germans in their Blitz of 1940 came from Russia). Given the strong communist tendencies of the large syndicates in France (labor unions) connected to strong leftist political parties, there was reason to worry about making enemies of Germany AND Russia. *An interesting footnote, the British and French had even considered sending troops to aid Finland in their fight against the Soviets.

The French generals may have been old with old ideas, but they weren't stupid either. I think it is more a case of France having many options, all of them ranging from bad to worse, in the short time they had. They were choosing from the many of lesser evils and having to hope for the best. France could have been saved with drastic changes starting in the late 1920s-early 1930s at all levels. After 1936, it was too late.