A few more notes:

No one, even the Germans expected Poland to colapse in three weeks. The Wehrmacht leaders hoped it would be fast, theyed be screwed if it dragged out, but everyone was dumfounded by how fast it went. The French leaders had thought four to six months of steady pressure would be required.

The French intelegence had been active gathering information on the German military, and the defenses in the west. There were many details missing but they had a fair idea of what was there. One problem was the nature of French intel analysis. The miltary intellegence department was a data gathering conduit for the commander. Independant analysis was not the primary goal. Rather the intel service porvied the data the comander wanted to support his goals and analysis. Unlike some other Armys the intel. chiefs job was not to come to the commander with one or more independant lines of thought and conclusions to advise him. This led to a situation where the senior commander reviewed data that supported his preexisting opnions and blinded him to other possiblitites. That is contradicitng data was not placed before him, and dismissed if it did appear by accident. In the case of Gamelin the French overall military leader, and Vuellimin the air forces commander this system failed badly as both became over focused on 'Potiential' German strengths and possible intents. The data indcating alternatives was in the hands of the French, but it was not placed before the commanders in any coherent fashion. This led directly to the complete suprise of the German "Sickle Cut" plan in May 1940.

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