Quote:
Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger
For one of the reasons take a look at the French mobilization schedule, the over all system, and the actual mobilization. Like the Wehrmacht the entire pool of reservists was not called up in a single order. Unlike in WWI both sides had their mobilization streatched out over 3-4 months. The third group of B divsions did not begain assembling until very late in the Autum. This was little different from the German reservist assembly.
The two differences between the French & German mobilization were; A. The Wehrmacht startedmobilization of the reserves a few weeks earlier & so was half a Step ahead. B. The French had no standing field force. The Wehrmacht had a group of partial strength units that could imeadiatly march off without mobilizing any reservists. The French active service units were either training groups, or static fortress units guarding the borders. Neither of these were capable of taking offensive action or marching anywhere.
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I generally agree with your statement here, though about the initial mobilization, I've heard differently. From what I understand, the organization and planning for a general mobolization was a model of efficiency, which in turn became bad news anyway. The 2 main factors were 1- Too many men were called up that home-front industries were severely affected by the loss of so many crucial workers. 2- So many men showed up at their assigned reception centers only to find mass chaos as the army soon realized they had more than they could handle all at once. The end result was that many thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, would be sent back home and called up at a later date.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger
The reasons for this system seem to have been political with some military theory added on. I've not delved too deeply into why. The result was that a week after mobilization begain there were only two corps available for limted offensive operations and another two ready for much more limited support actions. Altering thsi mobilization would have required changes reaching back several years. That is the French would have had to change their fundamental thinking about mobilization and the offence in 1937 or mid 1938 at the latest. Perhaps if the decsion had been made as late as Febuary 1939 a tank heavy mechanized corps could have been ready in the inital mobilization wave, perhaps one of the DLM and one of the DCR and more artillery, bu thats about it. To provide real offensive capability withing a week or two of intial mobilization would have required fundamental structural changes in the French Army and reserve system.
I have been told the French had a plan for attacking Germany, to be executed if the circumstances were right. Not yet looked for colaborating evidence, but here is what I was told:
Phase I. Clear the German border and secure the Saarland for a assembly area for the next phase. This is susposedly what the Sarr Offensive was all about.
Phase II. Late September - Oct. Close up to the main zone of the Siegfried line. Clear the German outer defenses, secure the Rhine river flank, reconoiter & probe the main defense zone.
Phase III. Late October - November. Make deliberate assualts on the main defense zone using overwhelming artillery firepower to annilihate defending units. The infantry would be heavily reinforced with engineer and assualt tank groups formed around the colossal B1 tanks. Airforce fighters would be concentrated over the battlefield.
The object would be to threaten the Ruhr, particularly the industry on the west bank of the Rhine, and close more of the Rhine river & its valley to industrial traffic. The river is critical to German industry for barge transportation and the paralle railroads were important as well. This attack was susposed to have forced the Germans to fight a attritional battle that the French thought themselves capable of.
This series of methodical deliberate assualts were exactly the sort of warfare the French army had trained for, so this plan is not implausable. It also matches the mobilization schedule. I'd have to learn more about it before judging its practicality, or actual intent to execute it.
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An interesting exerpt from the "Fall of France - The Nazi Invasion of 1940" by Julian Jackson, page 13:
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France's first rearnament plan was adopted in 1934, only to be followed by a cutback in expenditure in the next year."
My note: This more or less coincides with our statement that changes in france had to have occured in the early to mid 1930s to have any positive effect in 1939-40.
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Althought the decision to rearm dated back to 1934, the results were slow to emerge. production was initially hampered by a whole series of obstacles. After a year of retrenchment and under-investment the French arnaments industry was unable to meet the new demands made of it. In 1934 machine tools in French factories were on average 13 years older than those in Germany (20 years as opposed to 7). In the Hotchkiss factory, pieces were hand-finished with files as thewy might have been in the 1890s. To make matters worse, the army had little understanding of the economics of arms production. It demanded the submission of numerous prototypes before approving mass production of a selected design."
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Production was also disrupted by labour disturbances and strikes under the Popular Front (1936-7). In 1936 the Popular Front government nationalized a number of arnaments producers (mainly in the aircrafy industry), and if in the long runthis contributed to the modernization of the plant, in the short term it caused further disruption. Despite increased spending, the number of tanks produced actually fell between 1936 and 1938.