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Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
Somewhere I have a detailed listing of the units involved and a snyopsis of their performance, but it was really French doctrine that caused its failure. The second the French units ran into any resistance and the unexpected mines....how could they not expect mines?!!! These were known to exist (except the S-mine) and even the French had their own designs!...they basically went to ground, the advance stopped, and the units waited for the top decision makers to send orders on what to do next.
Of course, these officers were nowhere near the battlefield and went solely on what they got off dispatches and telephone calls (radio communications was very limited at most major headquarters in the French army in 1940). So, their picture of things was of course distorted.
French doctrine called for their units on meeting "unexpected" resistance to go over to the defense and then a new operational plan would be made. So, meeting resistance caused the first problem.
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I think you're reiterating what I've said all along. Applying outdated doctrine, or any doctrine shown to be almost the polar opposite of your opponent's, is bound to bring results that are almost always negative. Yes, the French had by then developed their own design for land mines, but their teachings of their use reflected that doctrine, in that it was unimaginative. To the French, it was almostly exclusively an anti-vehicle purpose weapon, whereas the Germans saw it's value by having the land strewn with them, come what may.
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Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
The second came from an unwillingness to take any real casualties or press forward in the face of any opposition. The third was that the French looked at their "offensive" more as a reconnissance in force or a show of force than a true organized and determined offensive.
In this situation no wonder it was a failure.
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I find this to be patently false. Besides, did you not just state, as I have been stating, that it was above all things outdated doctrine, in all of it's teachings and practice, that prevented any success on the part of the French? The reluctance of the French to give the Saar offensive any real momentum is almost solely out of two reasons: First, the main goal was to relieve pressure from Poland. It has been well established that most senior commanders and planners knew this to be highly unlikely even just before the offensive began. Yet, they went ahead with it anyway. Secondly, if it were truely their intentions to avoid casualties at all cost, then as I stated before, they could have not declared war on Germany over the invasion of Poland, or they could have declared war, then simply stayed behind the Maginot Line and conduct a 9 to 5 war with periodic artillery duals. As it was, French commanders learned very quickly during the Saar adventure how futile the offensive was, and how defficient their strategy was given the recieved wisdom they were all taught. A so-called "unwillingness" has nothing to do with it, and a "reconnaissance in force/show of force" could have easily been done using a few minor units, probably expendable colonials, to penetrate and skirmish in the area in queation.
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Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
Oh, and the last place I'd go for a reference is Moiser's horrible book The Blitzkrieg Myth.
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That is your opinion, and you're entitled to it.