VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS
By Valery Kalinin
Almost all Soviet intelligence agents warned Moscow of an imminent attack by Germany, but Stalin did not believe any of them
In the first months of the Great Patriotic War, German troops blockaded Leningrad, approached Moscow, occupied the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Belarus and the Crimea, and even hoisted the Nazi flag on Mt. Elbrus, the highest mountain of the Caucasus. It is usually alleged that Germany achieved these successes by “treacherously” invading the Soviet Union.
In the early postwar years, the surprise attack by German troops was blamed on the lack of information about Hitler’s plans. After the death of Stalin, it became clear that Soviet political and military leaders were warned of the planned attack. But Stalin thought it was misleading information designed to provoke an armed clash between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Hard times for intelligence service
The declassification of secret materials has allowed us to draw a fuller picture of the activity of the Soviet intelligence bodies (military intelligence, General Staff and the political intelligence of the People’s Commissariat of State Security) and the reaction of the Soviet leadership to their reports.
After the military defeat of France in June 1940, the international situation in Europe was complex, contradictory and volatile. Speculation about Hitler’s decision to break the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and cease military operations against Britain appeared after Hess, Hitler’s personal secretary and, since 1933, his deputy in the Party, flew to Britain in May 1941. At the same time, the foreign policy of Britain and the United States did not indicate any readiness to form an alliance with the Soviet Union in a likely military conflict with Germany. It will be recalled that, in March 1940, Britain and France planned to send an expeditionary corps to Finland and bomb the oil-fields of Baku and Grozny.
Preparing an attack against the Soviet Union, the political and military leaders of Germany attached special importance to the surprise factor. “It is extremely important to ensure that our intentions to attack remain secret,” said the preamble to Directive 21 (the Barbarossa Plan). The German leaders worked out a large-scale system designed to conceal preparations for aggression against the USSR. For instance, the Barbarossa Plan was typed only in eight copies. Four of them remained in Hitler’s safe, and four were sent to the headquarters of the supreme commander-in-chief and the main headquarters of the armed services. The personal role of Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goebbels in these measures shows what importance was attached to masking the planned aggression against the USSR.
Last, mention should be made of the mass repressions in Soviet intelligence, which seriously undermined data collection and processing. The heads of central and local bodies and the most competent agents were liquidated during the purge, and a large part of the intelligence network that had been built up abroad was destroyed. Five chiefs and acting chiefs of the military intelligence (Berezin, Uritsky, Gendin, Orlov and Proskurin) and four chiefs and acting chiefs of political intelligence (Trilisser, Artuzov, Spiengelglas and Passov) were arrested and shot between 1937 and 1940.
The intelligence service was reinforced by men who had proven their worth in the army, and by college graduates who did not know the principles of secret service work and often did not know foreign languages. Such was the situation in the decisive prewar years when the fate of the country depended on timely and trustworthy information.
Nevertheless, the surviving cadres, the newly trained agents, and the remaining network of agents were able to obtain information on Germany’s plans to attack the USSR and report it to the Soviet leadership.
After Hitler approved the Barbarossa Plan, political and military leaders of the USSR received many reports about the military and political plans of Germany. According to the data, about 60 reports were sent in June 1941 alone. Some of them contradicted one another, while others repeated what information was available. For this reason, it seems expedient to mention several reports from Germany on the eve of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union.
Alta, Korsikanets and Starshina
On December 18, 1940, Hitler approved Directive 21 (the Barbarossa Plan), and 11 days later, on December 29, our intelligence division received a message from the head of the Alta intelligence group in Berlin: “Hitler has issued an order to prepare for a war against the USSR. War will be declared in March 1941. The order is given to check and clarify this information.” On January 4, 1941, Alta sent a radio message confirming “the correctness of information about preparations in Germany for a war against the Soviet Union in Spring 1941. This information is based not on rumours but on Hitler’s special order known only to a limited circle of people.”
Under the Barbarossa Plan, the attack on the USSR was to be launched on May 15, 1941. The Alta message accurately reflected German intentions.
On January 21, 1941, the commander-in-chief of German land forces issued a directive on strategic deployment. Based on the Barbarossa Plan, it specified the tasks of different armies in war operations against Red Army. On February 28, Alta reported to Moscow: “In the opinion of informed military circles, war against Russia will certainly begin this year... Three groups of armies have been formed... The Konigsberg group of armies is to launch an attack towards Petersburg, the Warsaw group of armies -- towards Moscow, and the Pozen [Krakow] group of armies -- towards Kiev. The operations are supposed to begin on May 20.”
In subsequent reports, these groups of armies will be called North, Centre and South, and their strategic tasks will be to capture Leningrad (the North group), Moscow (the Centre group), and Kiev (the South group). Thus, in February 1941, the intelligence division reported to the military and political leaders of the country not only the date of the attack but also the combat plan, the strategic buildup of Wehrmacht for an attack and subsequent combat operations.
On March 20, F. I. Golikov, chief of the intelligence division, submitted a report on the likely directions of attack by Wehrmacht between May 15 and June 15. He concluded that the rumours and documents about a war against the USSR in spring 1941 should be regarded as misinformation.
On March 20, Starshina, an agent of the People’s Commissariat for State Security, reported from Berlin that there is a 50 percent chance that Germany may attack the Soviet Union, but the information may equally well prove to be a bluff.
On March 27, after the overthrow of the pro-German government in Yugoslavia, the general headquarters under Hitler’s command decided to send troops to that country. In view of the forthcoming military operations in Greece and Yugoslavia, Hitler gave the order to postpone Operation Barbarossa for five weeks. Since Hitler put off the attack on the Soviet Union from May to June, the intelligence bodies began to send information about the new dates of the German invasion.
On April 14, Korsikanets and Starshina, agents of the People’s Commissariat for State Security, reported from Berlin that a German ultimatum could be expected after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece.
On April 22, Dora, an illegal stationary agent in Geneva, reported that, in government’s circles in Berlin, April 15 was being mentioned as the date of an invasion of Ukraine. On May 5, agent AVC reported from Bucharest that “a German military operation against the USSR was to begin on May 15, but in connection with Yugoslavia, it was postponed to the middle of June.”
On May 10, the People’s Commissariat for State Security received a message from Berlin: “The question of the German invasion of the Soviet Union has been finally decided. It is not known whether any demands will be made of the Soviet Union, and for this reason an unexpected attack must be taken in account.”
On May 14, Merkulov, People’s Commissar for State Security, reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria that preparations for an operation against the Soviet Union were in full swing in the air headquarters in Germany. He added that Germany would first issue an ultimatum, demanding expanded export of goods from the USSR to Germany and renunciation of communist propaganda. The ultimatum will be preceded by “a war of nerves.”
On May 16, Starshina reported: “1. Germany has completed all military preparations for an armed attack on the USSR, and the strike can be expected any time. 2. Hungary will take an active part in the German war operations.”
In his report to Stalin, Molotov and Beria in May 1941, Merkulov gave an account of an interrogation of four German deserters, emphasizing that many German soldiers “sympathize with the Soviet Union” and fear encountering “the strong Red Army with its great number of tanks and aircraft, and the vast territory.”
On June 10, at a meeting with top military officers, Hitler made known the final date for invading the USSR. The commander-in-chief of the land forces issued an instruction saying “that June 22 is to be considered the D-Day of Operation Barbarossa.”
British provocation
Shortly before the invasion, Soviet intelligence officers did their utmost to convince the political and military leaders of the country that Germany would invade the USSR without warning.
The intelligence division. The illegal stationary agents (Ramzai in Tokyo, Dora in Switzerland and Otto in France) and military intelligence residents in Berlin (with information provided by Alta), Sofia and Vichy warned of imminent aggression, while agent XVC in the German embassy in Moscow reported that the invasion will be launched early in the morning (3:00 or 4:00) of June 22.
But the military intelligence was unable to convince the political leadership of the inevitable attack. On June 21, 1941, General I.A. Susloparov, the military attache in France, sent a report that, according to reliable sources, the German invasion will begin on June 22. Stalin wrote on the copy of this message: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who sent it and punish him.”
Army General, P.I. Ivashutin, former head of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU), writes in a collection of articles entitled Soldiers of the Invisible Front, “The texts of almost all documents and radiograms concerning German military preparations and the dates of its attack were made known to Stalin (two copies), Molotov, Beria and Voroshilov, the people’s commissar for defence, and the chief of the General Staff... At the beginning of the war, the intelligence directorate assessed the enemy forces to be used against the USSR as follows: 191 divisions, 146 of them German. These data are very close to the actual figures of 199 and 154, respectively.”
The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs. On June 2, 1941, Beria reported to Stalin and Molotov on German military preparations along the Soviet frontier. “If Germany unleashes a war against the USSR,” he concluded, “it will probably be the result of an Anglo-German agreement that will lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities between Germany and Britain.”
The People’s Commissariat for State Security. On June 9, Merkulov reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria that the question of war will be finally decided on the next week. “Germany will demand that the Soviet Union grant it the right to economic management of Ukraine, increase delivery of grain and oil, and use its navy, first of all submarines, against Britain,” he said.
On June 16, Merkulov acquainted Stalin with the message from Starshina. It said that the last measures for an attack had been taken. Stalin replied to Merkulov, “You can send your source in the German air force headquarters to the devil. He is not a source but a misinformer.”
On June 21, Beria, the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, curator of the People’s Commissariat for State Security and the Council of People’s Commissars and a Politburo member, reported to Stalin: “I again insist on the recalling and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov who continues to bombard me with misinformation about alleged preparations by Hitler for an attack on the USSR. He reported that this ‘attack’ will begin tomorrow. The same radio information was sent by Major General Tupikov, our military attache in Berlin. Referring to his residents in Berlin, this dull general asserts that three groups of armies of Wehrmacht will advance towards Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, and impudently demands that we supply these liars with a portable radio set.”
It should be admitted that Stalin and the political leaders of the Soviet Union were misled by a misinformation campaign by Nazi Germany. Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goebbels took personal part in it. Stalin believed, and the Politburo members, the heads of the People’s Commissariats for Defence, Internal Affairs and State Security agreed with him, that Germany would not invade the USSR before ending the war against Britain, or at least would make political and economic demands of the Soviet government before the attack.
It should be noted that, before the war, every people’s commissariat linked with activities abroad assessed foreign information independently and reported to the higher authorities on the sphere of its activities. This means that only some of the activities of the German state were made known by it. Before the war, the USSR had no state body to coordinate the intelligence service and people’s commissariats in gathering foreign information.
There is one more factor — military intelligence did not occupy the necessary place as the main structure among organizations linked with foreign activities (the people’s commissariats for foreign and internal affairs, state security and foreign trade) and responsible for disclosing the military and political plans of Germany.
In June 1940, when the threat of German attack increased, the intelligence division was withdrawn from the People’s Commissar for Defence and turned over to the General Staff of the People’s Commissariat for Defence. It was one more organizational and personnel reshuffle after the purges of 1937-1940. As a result, the intelligence division became one of the departments of the General Staff without direct access to the People’s Commissar for Defence. This lessened the importance of the intelligence division in the system and in dealing with other state bodies.
In addition, the Soviet leadership continued to distrust the intelligence division politically. Despite the increasing threat of German attack in 1941, Stalin asked the division head Golikov to report to him only once, in April.
As a result of underestimation of military intelligence and political distrust in it, the reports from military intelligence on the forthcoming German attack were not properly assessed by leaders of the Soviet Union. We paid the price of millions of our soldiers’ and civilians’ lives for these mistakes. It is especially appropriate to recall this when our country is preparing to mark the 60th anniversary of Great Victory.
http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=1360
and I found this too.
"These reports reached the Kremlin all day on the 21st of June. Colonel General Kirponos, the commander of the Kiev Military District, reported on the same day that a few German deserters had crossed the border and claimed the invasion would begin on the 22nd of June."
http://www.wargamer.com/articles/bprelude_part2.asp
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