REAR AREA SECURITY IN RUSSIA 1941-44
From June 1941 to July 1944 the German army fought on Russian soil. During the entire period the Germans were faced with the problem of fighting Russian partisans or guerrillas to hold open their lines of communications and vital base area.
German anti-partisan warfare went through three phases: (1) the German offensive of the summer and fall of 1941, (2) the Soviet counteroffensive of the winter 1`941-42 and the following German summer offensive to the Caucasus and Volga, ending in August of 1942, and (3) the German defensive battles from Stalingrad in November 1942 to the Soviet border in June 1944.
Each phase had its counterpart in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare. During the first phase the Soviet partisan movement was born and organized. I consisted of some 30,000 men, most of them hard-core communist functionaries supported by Red Army stragglers left behind the front of the advancing German armies. Although the Germans had hoped to be able to deal with guerrillas and secure their lines of communications by employing a total of 9 so-called security divisions (three divisions in each of three army groups), it soon was evident that regular front-line units had to be assigned for specific anti-partisan operations.
These operations were conducted in all sectors of the front and at varying times. They ranged from small-scale operations (up to company strength) to large-scale operations by special task forces of up to division strength, and mopping-up operations (today termed search and destroy operations) as well as pacification operations (today called clear and hold operations). The largest units the Germans withdrew front he front were regiments and battalions. Frequently, such regular forces were employed to clear certain parts of infested areas during redeployment moves. It took at least an 8 to 1 superiority to destroy a partisan unit by encirclement.
During the second phase, the Soviet partisan movement ran to a strength of about 150,000, organized into brigades and regiments. The partisans now had the capability of threatening rear area security to the extent that the operations of field armies and army groups were affected. The Germans were forced to counter the threat by resorting to large-scale operations, especially in the center and north sectors of the front.
The Germans launched a typical operation of this kind in the Yelnya-Derogobruzh area in January-June 1942. The Russian guerrilla and regular forces in the area numbered about 20,000 men. The German Fourth Army committed two army corps plus elements of a third, totalling [sic] seven divisions, plus security forces. Because of attrition and relatively low effective combat strengths, the German force was about equal in strength to the Soviet partisan forces, but superior in terms of mobility, firepower, and training. The Germans also had the advantage of
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initiative. They killed or captured all but about ten percent of this group. The leadership and hard-core elite escaped.
During the third phase, the partisans had about a quarter of a million men. They were organized into brigades, groups, regiments, and battalions and were supported by the local population of large areas under partisan control. The partisan units were equipped with heavy weapons, artillery and even tanks. The Germans streamlined their anti-partisan organization, strengthened their security forces, and adopted aggressive counter-measures. Most effective were large-scale encirclement operations. The Germans employed, depending on the area, forces from one division to a reinforced army corps with up to half a dozen combat divisions. In terms of battalions, the total strength of some operations (e.g., Operation Zigeunerbaron near Bryansk) reached 40 battalions, reinforced by tanks, artillery and aircraft. None of these operations was fully successful because the Germans lacked the strength to throw tight encir[c]lement rings around the partisan areas.
To guard their lines of communications in the spring of 1943, the Germans employed about 250,000 men on security missions (150 German security battalions, 90 collaborator battalions, 30 satellite battalions, and more than 50,000 auxiliary police). In addition 10 training and reserve divisions had to be moved from the zone of the interior to Russia, and combat troops (divisions and corps) had to be withdrawn from the front for periods of weeks and even months. Conservative estimates would place German and Axis manpower employed in anti-partisan and security actions at 400,000 men. German commanders estimated that they would have needed twice the number to eliminate the guerrillas. These figures compare to an average strength of German land forces in the East of about 3.3 million in the summer of 1941 and 2 million in mid-1944.
?Charles V. P. von Luttichau
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