I'll have to go back & review Wesleys lecture. When I read through the text four years ago a number of errors jumped out at me. But, I did not take notes or otherwise investigate his remarks.

In the last three years my research has been largely confined to the US artillery. Sifting through the eyewitness accounts, of the artillerymen and infantry leaders I've found the ability of the latter to control fires to be overstated by many second hand comentators. The most acessable source is McDonalds book 'Company Commander' decribing his command of two different rifle companys in the 1st US Divsion. He mentions many artillery attacks & is fairly clear that the targets he or his company staff are directing fire on are preplanned targets already set up by artillery Obs teams. I can recall one unplanned target controled by a member of his rifle company & it went slowly. In almost all the missions the call for fire was routed through a FO, or via the artillery liasion team at McDonalds battalion CP, not directly to the artillery battalion CP or a battery.

Elsewhere I've run across infantry leaders, or others communicating directly to the artillery on a emergency basis. Usually using the dead FO teams equipment. In the 1980s we still drew a distinction between trained and untrained observers. Trained being defined as someone who had been thorugh everal months of school & or field training in observing fires and someone who had a few hours or days of training. Where the call for fire went beyond immeadiate or emergency needs the difference was clear.

From the Journal of Royal Artillery (British) I have a paragraph describing a 1941 or 42 attempt, sucessfull, at having a tank squadron commander direct artillery fires on targets of opportunity after a 'breakthorough' in Lybia or Egypt. The jist of the artical was 'Hey this proves it can work, we need to have everyone get on board with it.'

__________________
I forgot my password, can I use yours?