Thanks for pointing that out. It was the Pockets not the Points. The Battle of the Points was the one where the Japanese attempted to insert more troops into Bataan via several amphibious landings, which was from January 23, to Feb. 13. The Battle of the Pockets was fought from January 27 to Feb. 17, roughly just after the first landings of the Battle of the Points.

According to my books, Homma had planned to push into Bataan using these two thrusts (sea and land). In the Battle of the Pockets, patrols had found Japanese troops infiltrating into the rear of Orion-Bagac line behind the 11th Div and in the Gogo-Cotar River Valley in the rear of the 1st Div. One source claims that of the 2,000 Japanese committed to this battle, only 377 made it back to Japanese lines.

At around this time, Homma's Fourteenth Army, which consisted of two reinforced divisions (16th and 48th), roughly a 100,000 troops in total, was put to a halt. Homma was forced to suspend all offensive operations. He had about 7,000 battlefield casualties but his worse problem was that he had nearly 20,000 troops out of action because of ill health.
Thus, the Japanese timetable was wrecked. Japan had to divert more troops, equipment and supplies (which were originally earmarked for other operations in the original timetable) to the Philippines.
Such was the state of the Japanese situation that it was only in March 27 did Homma resume active offensive operations.

During the relative lull, a look on the numbers would show that there was now rough parity between Bataan's garrison and the Japanese forces, which had to set aside sizable numbers of troops into securing the rest of the Philippines. And that was what led some US officers whose head were in the clouds to think of mounting a counter offensive. But with what troops? If the Japanese, who were relatively better supplied had problems, the Bataan garrison had it even worst. The Bataan garrison had about 80,000 troops which included 15,000 US soldiers (and stranded air corps personnel who were used as infantry men.)

Since the Bataan garrison was on one-third rations, hundreds of soldiers were suffering from various diseases, most notably malaria. It was quickly pointed out that it was impractical for the starving, ill Bataan troops to mount any kind of major offensive action.