Quote:
Originally Posted by Kai-Petri
I have not been too interested in the Pacific war but lately I have been reading stuff on it.
Just to bring a couple of questions up and keep discussions alive:
1. Was the Japanese tactics after Pearl Harbor correct? It is claimed that it was more like " we attack everywhere " and all the Japanese forces were too widely separated. Jamamoto´s tactics? Any ideas? Could they have been more victorious with other tactics? More ideas?
Jamamoto´s principles I guess:
-Initiate surprise attack on US PACFLT at Pearl Harbor.
-seize all available natural resources in Pacific;
-retire to defensive perimeter behind island barriers;
-await US to sue for peace
2.Until November 26, 1941, Roosevelt had been negotiating with two Japanese diplomats who had come to Washington to try to resolve a crisis with the United States which began in August 1941. At that time, with no warning, the United States embargoed all shipments of oil to Japan. The Japanese were baffled and infuriated by this decision. For three previous years, the United States had supplied fifty percent of Japan's oil, while her army conquered much of China. Why had Roosevelt chosen this moment to cut off the oil?
Instead Roosevelt let Secretary of State Cordell Hull present the Tokyo diplomats with a ten point ultimatum on November 26, 1941.
Tokyo had set November 29 as a deadline for a settlement. After that the Japanese negotiators were told that war would become inevitable.
Maybe the Japanese had underestimated the US but as well it seems the US underestimated the Japanese...
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Read this url, and i think the Japanes could have put the USN in the same boat as Germany and Japan faced later on in the war...
A Lack of US Oil Tankers
It is interesting to note that only one ship located on Battleship Row on 7 December received no damage at all. Yet, had the Japanese sank or severely damaged this ship, its effect on the Pacific Fleet would have been almost as great a loss as sinking an aircraft carrier. That ship was the fleet oil tanker, USS Neosho. (93)
The lack of fleet oilers, like Neosho, hung like a large cement albatross around the neck of Navy planners contemplating operations in the Pacific before and after the Pearl Harbor raid. (94) This dearth of oilers was a key vulnerability of the Navy. The Japanese Navy, who had just seen how it would have been impossible to carry out the Pearl Harbor attack without tanker support, should have targeted these ships that were so crucial to the Navy.
In the years from 1925 to 1940, the quantity of most surface combatants in the Navy had doubled in size; the size of the auxiliary force had not. Although there had been an increase in the number of fleet oilers, they were all kept busy ferrying fuel between bases. (95) On 7 December, the Pacific Fleet had two oilers in Pearl Harbor and three at sea and six others in ports on the west coast; only four of these were capable of at-sea refueling. (96) This shortage of tankers effectively limited the radius of the Pacific Fleet. (97) It was also a key reason so many ships were located in Pearl Harbor on 7 December. Kimmel was unable to keep less than half his fleet at sea without starting to deplete the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor; his limited supply of oilers could not keep up with the deficit. (98)
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Because of this lack of oilers, the fleet could not have even exercised its primary war plan (even if most of its battle line was not at the bottom of Pearl Harbor). The total capacity of the Pacific Fleet's oilers was 760,000 barrels of oil. In the first 9 days after Pearl Harbor, the fleet had expended 750,000 barrels of this sum. Thus, the fleet was tied to its oil supply at Pearl Harbor, (99) and if the Japanese had attacked the oil storage and the associated oilers at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, they would have driven the Pacific Fleet back to the west coast. (100)
If the Pacific Fleet had been forced back to the west coast, would it have been effective in opposing the Japanese? The short answer is no, especially if the Japanese began targeting oilers. To give an example, the USS Lexington was dispatched from California to assist in the search for Amelia Earhart in July 1937. First, the Lexington had to top off its bunkers on the west coast. (101) It then proceeded on a high-speed run of about 30 knots to the Hawaiian Islands. Here, it had to refuel again from the fleet oiler USS Ramapo off Lahaina Roads, Maui. The result was that the Lexington did not arrive in the search area off Howland Island until 11 days after its departure from the west coast and could not even have done that without the support of the Ramapo. (102)
Ships sortieing from the west coast would be adding 2,000 nautical miles to their patrols into the Pacific just to get to Hawaii. (103) This number would have to be doubled, obviously, because these same ships would have to get back to the west coast if no oiler support were available and the oil storage at Pearl Harbor no longer existed.
from[url="http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_1_28/ai_n6172425/pg_11"]
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