Quote:
Originally Posted by JCFalkenbergIII
Ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, tended to be a much more pernicious problem. In the early stages of the Army's expansion there were plans calling for a high priority in the production of 105mm shells of all types, inasmuch as these were the standard, general-support divisional field piece. Ammunition for heavier guns was accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the utility of large, unwieldy and relatively immobile large artillery pieces. Unfortunately, a number of factors then intervened. First, congressional criticism was raised over large over stocks of all types of artillery ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943. The Army was pressured to scale back production, particularly of 105mm ammunition. Secondly, the perceived need for an expansion of the heavy and medium artillery was mirrored by an expansion of the production facilities for the heavier types of shells. The expansion in heavy shell production was facilitated by converting light ammunition production to heavy. Thus, by late 1943 priorities had shifted radically. Many plants were retooling for other production, while some 105mm plants were closed completely. Events in France and Italy in mid 1944 then changed all the assumptions again. The fierce German resistance in the bocage of Normandy and in the Appenine Mountains of Italy placed a premium on all types of ammunition - just as stocks of 105mm ammunition began to shrink. Rationing was instituted (and extended to most other types of mortar and artillery ammunition), and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized against their former owners. By 1 January 1945 the entire ETO stock of 105mm ammunition was reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, a twenty-one-day supply according to War Department planning factors, which were widely acknowledged to be too optimistic. The poor flying weather encountered in Europe in the fall and winter exacerbated this near-disastrous situation: Allied airpower was not always available to take up the slack. Although emergency measures in theater and in the U.S. improved matters, artillery ammunition shortages were to remain a chronic problem until the end of the war in Europe. Military History Online - US Army in World War II |
Quote:
Originally Posted by Slipdigt
Well, I suppose when you consider the speed of the advance across Europe and the problems with getting supplies to forward units it is less surprising. Consider the situation before Market Garden, Generals vying to be the main effort so that they could have sufficient supplies to actually advance. I think the real surprise is that the US went to the effort of forming a unit specifically to use German artillery rather than soldiers just making the most of what they captured.[/url]
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The speed of advance was the second part of the ammo shortage of 1944. The logistics planners back in 1942-43 had thought the advance across France would be much slower. COSSAC had assumed a sensible conservative German defense which would slow the Allied advance from the coast to the German border to six or seven months. Assuming a landing in May Paris would be captured in September and Metz secured in November. Consequently the scehdule for delivering locomotives, rail cars, and heavy trucks did not bring the full complement from the US until it was estimated they would be needed - when the rail centers of France were captured between Spetember and October. When Hitlers high risk strategy for defending Fortress Europe collapsed in Late July and France was overrun in a single month the Allied logistics commands found themselves without the heavy transport they badly needed. The Red Ball Express and other emergency measures were helpfull, but not up to the requirements.
This transportation shortage was aggravated by the failure to rapidly open the ports. The German defense of Brest and Antwerp prevented the timely use of either and the through sabatoge did not help. It was fortunate the artificial harbors on the Channel coast exceeded expectations.
The third leg of the ammo problem was consumption. The original estimates had been based on the sucess of the untried US Army infantry and armor. The doctrine trained to had required much more out of the US infantry than they delivered. Army doctrine also expected the armored divsions to do a lot more exploitation and manuver than they actually did. For whatever reasons both the US infantry regiments and the armored divsions found themselves frequently stalled by skilled German defenses, and blasting them out with air and artillery fires proved the fastest solution. we were fortunate the US and British both had a artillery doctrine that fit the situation.
This led to large scale overdraws of ammo stocks in Britian. As early as June 1944 Bradley found his artillery was shooting out the ammo into the hedgerows of Normandy faster than it could be brought across from Britian. Revamping the shipping plan or schedule across the Channel helped some, but the siege of Cherbourg and later the siege of Brest increased consumption. When the borde battle begain in September the demand on the artillery increased again as the weather begain restricting air operations.