During World War II, the world held its breath as Nazi Germany attempt to conquer most of the industrialized world. Fortunately, Hitler's dream of the Third Reich was defeated. Despite this fact, world leaders, intellectuals, and citizens of the Allied Powers still had many problems to deal with between themselves. One of the key ideological debates of this time revolved around the argument of who could truly claim the honor of defeating the most evil empire in the 20th century. Americans feel that without their contribution of supplies to the war effort along with their courageous fights at the Battle of the Bulge and Battle of Normandy the war could have possibly not be won. At the same time, Russians feel that their ability to sacrifice millions upon millions of lives along with their fateful stand at Stalingrad were the key reasons for the Allied powers defeating Germany.


In Stalingrad: A Fateful Siege, by Antony Beevor, Russia's War by Richard Overy, and The Road to Stalingrad by John Erickson, readers are able to judge for themselves just how important Russia was to the war effort. Also, readers are able to further delve into this fact by examining exactly who in Russia was responsible for defeating the Germans. At first glance, it may seem easy to give credit to the supreme leader of Russia, Joseph Stalin, but if one carefully examines the records of Russia during World War II, it is clear that throughout Stalin's time as leader there were blunders that led to the deaths of thousands upon thousands of people. These mistakes could have ranged from paranoia to arrogance to impatience. Certainly, a leader like this can not be given the credit of being the main factor for victory. Although, it is hard to argue that Stalin had no value whatsoever. In any case, the true reasons for Russian victory on the Eastern Front in World War II must include Hitler's madness, one of Russia's greatest generals, Georgy Zhukov, the historical Russian winter, and most importantly, the will of the Russian people.


In a twist of irony, the harsh winter that led to the defeat of Napoleon in 1812 would also come to haunt Hitler's 6th Army despite the fact Hitler made conscious attempts to avoid the same pitfalls of Napoleon. A key example of this is Hitler's desire to focus his resources on Ukraine and Southern Russia for its wheat and oil production as opposed to Moscow, something Napoleon's armies sought, despite the fact that many of Hitler’s generals had warned him against such a plan (Beevor 20). Due to Hitler's arrogance and possibly, superstition, he refused to attack Moscow. This would be one of the many blunders that Hitler would make during World War II. The important thing to remember in Hitler's quest to conquer the world was that the same characteristics which made it possible for him to reach the heights of his power would also be the same qualities that would lead to his downfall. Beevor notes, In hindsight, it seems like Hitler was more like a compulsive gambler, subconsciously trying to increase the odds . The horrific consequences for millions only to strengthen his megalomania (Beever 50). To many, it would seem it was the German army that collapsed on itself rather than the Russians defeating it.


The Russian winter also crippled the Germans more than any number of Russian T-34s or katyusha rockets. First, it prevented the Germans from attacking with their soldiers and tank crews as well as they could have. Beevor clearly describes this situation as he writes, Drifting snow concealed deep gullies. In places tall steppe grass, covered in hoar frost, stuck up above the snow, while further on drifts extended in deceptively soft curves. Tank crews were thrown about so much that only their padded helmets saved them from being knocked senseless (Beevor 245). Also, Beevor states, As the blizzard intensified, snow blocked gun sights and filled the slits of the coaxially mounted machine-gun besides the main armament (Beevor 246). Second, the weather greatly limited the Germans ability to use their superiority on the air. It may have been possible for Germans to stop the encirclement in Stalingrad if the Luftwaffe reconnaissance had been able to identify the impending attack, but they could not due to the weather (Beevor 252). It would also be a huge burden to get planes up in the air during the winter due to the fact that fires had to be lit under the motors to even get them started. Lastly, the weather absolutely destroyed the morale of the soldiers, since they were not given the proper equipment. Conditions became so bad that suicide turned into a major problem for the German army. As a result, officers often gave the decree, A soldier's life belongs to the Fatherland (Beevor 44).


In the build up towards the humiliating loss in the major Battle of Stalingrad, Hitler makes many tactical errors as a military and political leader. First, he delayed the plan to invade Russia by five weeks in order to secure the Balkans. This would cause his soldiers to run into a bitterly, cold winter in the middle of their invasion. Second, Hitler along with many Germans felt an air of invincibility due to the fact that the Nazis had rolled over their previous enemies with such ease. Also, for years, Hitler along with many Nazi propagandists had taught the Germans that they were racially superior to the Russians and Slavs. One German captain exclaimed, The war with Russia will only last four weeks (Beevor 14). Third, given the fact that Stalin was so cruel to his people, it would have been possible to win over those that opposed Stalin to fight for the Nazis. Some Ukrainians were even greeting the Nazis with black crosses as a symbol of a new crusade against the anti-Christ, Stalin (Beevor 26). Hitler destroyed this opportunity by training his military to subjugate these people. This is seen as many civilians were starved, massacred, or sent to work camps (Beevor 61). Fourth, despite the Russian winter, Hitler refused to send all of his soldiers proper clothing and supplies. This can be seen as German civilians were pressed to send their fur coats and anything else they could supply for their patriotic duty (Beevor 44). Fifth, Hitler had problems trusting his generals even people like General Hans Hube of the 16th Panzer Division who was a renowned World War I veteran that had the respect of the soldiers under his command (Beevor 94). By the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, Hitler considered General Hube a pessimist due to the fact that he told him the actual situation on the ground in Stalingrad. This is clearly unfair as Beevor writes, In its way, the fighting in Stalingrad was even more terrifying than the slaughter at Verdun (Beevor 149). Also, many men suffered from frostbite, malnutrition, battle stress, and a host of other physical ailments. Lastly, the biggest problem of all is the fact that Hitler did not understand what it took to run an army. Beevor describes it best when he writes, This armchair strategist never possessed the qualities for true generalship, because he ignored practical problems. During the brief campaign in Poland, Scandinavia, France, and the Balkans, resupply had at times been difficult , but never an insurmountable problem. In Russia, however, logistics would be as decisive a factor as firepower, manpower, mobility, and morale (Beevor 123).


The resolve of the Russian troops to protect their homeland was of epic proportions. Without these men, Stalin would have never been considered a great leader. The fact that Russian troops in the Battle of Moscow and Kiev fought amidst certain death exemplifies the patriotism of the Russian people. Thousands were ordered to charge with no ammunition or weapons, yet they still did it. Beevor writes, The Germans quickly found that surrounded or outnumbered Soviet soldiers went on fighting when their counterparts from western armies would have surrendered (Beevor 25). The fighting spirit of the Russians can be seen in the defense of the citadel of Brest-Livotsk. Red Army troops were able to hold off the Germans forces for over a month without any resupply of ammunition or food. The mindset of the Russian soldier can be summed up with the writing on the walls of the city which stated, I am dying but do not surrender. Farewell Motherland (Beevor 26). This attitude which permeated throughout the war wound up becoming the driving force for Russian success.


Some other side factors that worked distinctively in the advantage of Stalin and the Russians were the fact that the Japanese had abandoned their desire to use their army to invade Russia. As a result, the Russians were able to divert nearly all of the military in the East towards the West to fight Germany. Another key factor was the Germans inability to focus solely on the Eastern Front due to the fact that the Japanese had attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. Another major contributor to Russian victory was the shipment of US supplies. Stalin, who did not like to admit his reliance on the US stated, according to General Zhukov, If we had had to deal with Germany one-to-one we would not have been able to cope because we lost so much of our industry (Overy 195). A close examination of the records also prove that this is true. The United States supplied the Russians with 35,000 radio stations, 380,000 field telephones, and 956,000 miles of telephone cable (Overy 194). In vehicles, the United States supplied 77,900 jeeps, 151,000 light trucks, and over 200,000 Studebaker army trucks (Overy 194). Also, the Soviets were given 57.8% of aviation fuel requirements, 53% of all explosives, and almost half the wartime supply of copper, aluminum, and rubber (Overy195). The key distinction between these supplies and what the Russians already had was the fact that the Americans gave the Soviets the ability to be more mobile than they had ever been before. Most importantly, the Russians now had the ability to outmaneuver their enemy.


The most obvious group of issues that now must be examined is Stalin's own leadership. As Hitler, Stalin also fell into the pitfall of arrogant, paranoid, and stubborn behavior. The most obvious example of this is Stalin's apparent trust of Hitler before he invaded Russia despite many warnings. In the previous eight months before Operation Barbarossa, there had been over eighty warnings to Russia (Beevor 3). To Stalin, reports from British intelligence agents warning of an impending attack showed that Winston Churchill was plotting to drag Russia into war (Beevor 4). Stalin felt that there was no way that Hitler would be willing to start a war with Russia due to the fact that many important economic goods were going to Germany. Stalin sent Hitler 1.5 million tons of oil and wheat. Also, Stalin sent Germany tons of rubber, timber, iron, phosphates, and other valuable metal ores.


As a result of Stalin’s trust in Hitler, the Soviet military would not be prepared.. There was only a fraction of troops on the front lines, and hundreds of planes were lined up, which would became easy targets for the Luftwaffe (Overy 76). Even when Stalin was told of the news, he failed to respond as a great leader. Beevor writes, Stalin, on hearing the news, apparently sank into his chair and said nothing (Beevor 9). This can also be seen as Stalin was unable to address the Russian people directly after the attack. It was Foreign Minister Molotov that addressed the Russian people. Interestingly, reservists from all over the country rushed to report for duty. There were even circumstances where 81 year old men had lined up to volunteer (Beevor 10). This fact calls into question Stalin's true ability to motivate the Russians to fight. Perhaps, Russians' cultural upbringing to fight for their land was really the true cause of fervent patriotism.
A plausible reason for the failure of Stalin to understand the probability of the Germans attacking him was due to the fact that he had surrounded himself by many, incompetent associates. Georgy Malenkov is a prime example of this. Throughout Stalin's earlier years Malenkov had been a close friend of Stalin. As a result, of Stalin's ability to trust Malenkov led him to appoint him in positions of power (Beevor 9). Another example of an incompetent appointment of Stalin's was that of Soviet ambassador, Vladimir Dekanozov. He was one of the few people which spoke with Stalin that actually believed Hitler posed no threat (Beevor 4). The problem was that his opinion meant absolutely nothing due to the fact that he had no experience in foreign affairs. Clearly, cronyism was a rampant problem during Stalin's years as leader. Stalin's desire to surround himself with people that he felt posed no threat or opinion other than his own is no clearer than through the analysis of the purge of the red army. Stalin mercilessly slaughtered thousands upon thousands of loyal soldiers and officers due to his own paranoia.


Another key problem with Stalin was the fact that he constantly meddled in the affairs of the military. The most stark example of this is during the attack on Moscow. The Germans who had been overstretched by Hitler were incapable of taking the city due to their own exhaustion and lack of supplies. As a result, Zhukov was able to hold the city. The problem set in when Stalin ordered Zhukov to continue pursuing the Germans past their own lines of defense. As a result, the Russian troops became overstretched, and they wound up taking many unnecessary casualties. Stalin also showed lack of leadership as he constantly changed officers. There was one instance where he even rang an army commander to dismiss him, then told him to call one of his own corps commanders to let him know of his promotion (Beevor 89).


Although there is this mound of information indicting Stalin as a horrible leader, there are still many other facts which to some absolve Stalin of this claim . The first major defense of Stalin revolves around the fact that he was in fact a great diplomat. This is seen through the Russian-Germany Pact as it could be seen as Stalin’s way to stall for more time to develop his own country. In this argument, it is stated that Stalin who was undertaking major industrialization efforts knew that he could not achieve them and at the same time, defeat Hitler. Stalin stated, We are in no position to cope with a German attack (Erickson 96). In Stalin's tact, he was willing to make many appeasements to Hitler in order to leave as much time as possible. He was even willing to give Germany 5 million tons of grain per year according to a German ambassador (Erickson 78). Another key moment in which Stalin proved himself as a diplomat can be seen as he reached an agreement with the Japanese for the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Not only was Stalin able to achieve peace, but also, he was able to do it without promising less aid to China (Erickson 76).


Another common praise of Stalin is his ability to will the Russian people through the Great Patriotic War. He did this by referring to the Russian citizens as brothers and sisters , and by proclaiming the fact, that the Motherland, which was in danger, must be protected by all means possible. Recruiting posters which stated, The Motherland Calls , sum up the sentiment that grew in the country (Beevor 27). The effect was obvious as over four million people wound up signing up for the military shortly after the opening invasions of Germany. The inner thoughts of some soldiers have been found in diaries which state, Our aim is to defend something greater than millions of lives. I am not speaking about my own life. The only thing to be done is to lose it to some advantage for the Motherland (Beevor 28). Stalin also used propaganda to join people into the war effort. When he made his first initial speech after Germany declared war, Stalin made sure to not take any blame. Also, when Moscow was about to be invaded, Stalin decided it was a good idea to have Zhukov's reinforcements march through the Red Square to curry more patriotism. It worked (Beevor 39).


For those that didn't have the same determination to save the Motherland or speak idealistically of it, Stalin had his own ways to motivate them for the great cause of fighting Hitler. Any man or woman that retreated from the front lines or factories were usually sentenced a minimum of 10 years of hard labor to the Gulag for the charge of being a Traitor to the Party and to the Soviet State . People that spoke of German success or the incompetence of the Russia defense were risking a similar fate as they were deemed fear mongers . Religious activity was also not tolerated as a brother gave advice to recite his prayers before battle. He was condemned for Anti-party actions . Without such actions, Beevor notes that the war with Russia could not be won due to the fact that Stalin needed the entire country to join together. The mass mobilization of mothers, daughters, sons, and fathers in the Soviet Union made it possible to mobilize enough Russian forces to halt the Germans (Beevor 224).


Another frequent criticism of Stalin is the fact that the military was in disarray, and this opinion is based off of Stalin's purge of the military. While the purge certainly did not help matters, it is unlikely that the military would have performed much better due to the fact that there was still a large percentage of the military that was left in tact according to historian Richard Overy. The fact that military technology was far behind the rest of world powers was also something out of Stalin’s control. To make matters worse, there were many generals within the military that had archaic ideas on military weapons. The 76-mm and 107-mm guns, 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns were all integral parts of the military in World War II, yet the High Command Artillery Reserve decided it be better to produce less guns in 1941 than 1939 (Erickson 63). Another key problem was the fact that the Russian air force was inferior in training and equipment to the Luftwaffe, but major production had not begun until 1937 (Erickson 64). The demolition division was another key deficiency in the Soviet Army. Marshal Kulik persuaded many within the Soviet ranks that mines were the weapon of the weak (Erickson 72). As a result, when the war was at its most critical phases, the Soviets only had 120 anti-tank mines. Obviously, this was a costly mistake. One of the most important things of a modern army, communication, also did not exist in the Soviet military. There was no organization of communication services in the rear for the Soviets, and this caused major problems as they could not coordinate air and land attacks (Erickson 73). Lastly, a lack of armored units left the Soviets in disarray due to the fact that they could not move their artillery as freely as the Germans.


The reforms Stalin made to the Soviet economy are one of the key reasons that the Soviets were able to stand with the Germans in the war. To understand the intensity in which Stalin performed these reforms one only needs to see his quote in which he stated, “We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they will crush us.” The results are clear as 80% of the population moved from rural communities to the city. Also, millions of tons of resources were produced. This gave Russians the ability to produce weapons and tanks at high rates during the war.


The Russian T-34 tank, which was a large factor in the Russians victory, must be examined. It is clear as a German tanker remarked, It was depressing to realize how inferior our tanks were (Beevor 91). The only problem for Russia was that during the beginning of the war there were not enough of them to make up for German tactics and numbers. By 1942, Russia produced 24,446 tanks compared to Germany’s 9,300 (Overy 155). Also, In 1942, Russia produced 25,436 aircraft against Germany’s 15,409 (Overy 155). These numbers would have been impossible without Stalin’s strong hand of leadership during the rapid industrialization process of Russia during the decades before 1941. Richard Overy, a Russian historian, forcefully writes, “Without the economic transformation, the Red Army would have a feeble force in 1941 (Overy 32).”


Stalin’s failure to implement correct strategies for the war in the beginning phases is also unfair due to some due to the fact that there were many generals who supported several of the policies that Stalin wound up introducing. First, was the fact that the generals within the military convinced Stalin to leave much of his major industrial forces and machinery in Western Russia despite the fact that there was always the possibility that Hitler could invade and destroy Russia's ability to produce machinery (Erickson 86). Also, many military generals focused on the potential threat of Hitler attacking Moscow along with Stalin (Erickson 85). As a result, they were not prepared for Hitler's attack on Ukraine and Kiev. Erickson writes, The Germans plan to rip their way through the Soviet center in no way dawned upon the Red Army command (Erickson 86). Also, according to Erickson, the warnings of the impending German attack on Hitler can not be seen as completely his fault due to the fact that Admiral Kuznetsov placed doubt upon them as he required the man that issued the report, Voronstov, to return to Moscow from Berlin to personally authenticate the information (Erickson 95). Lastly, the Russian-German front that was occupied had poorly developed defenses and this is due to General Voroshilov (Overy 55). He felt that a line of fortifications in the newly, conquered territories should not be established. He also stated that the infantry units should be split form the tank corps, which was also a mistake (Overy 55).


Of all the arguments defending and promoting Stalin as great leader, the last one that must be analyzed is his personal authority over the military. This is one of the more convoluted areas to discuss due to the fact that for brief periods of time Stalin did not rely on his generals. To understand the expertise of Zhukov, one only needs to look at the extravagant Russian war games which were made to simulate a possible German attack. When Zhukov was the commander of both the “German” and “Russian” forces, he found ways to defeat his colleagues both times (Overy 66). Overy also writes, “Zhukov was a good battlefield commander, capable of immersing himself in detail without losing sight of the campaign. He was a soldier’s soldier, tough, decisive, outwardly calm and confident (Overy 100).” As a result of this, and several other factors, Stalin found much favor with Zhukov. Defenders of Stalin seem to concur although Stalin was not a great military strategist Stalin was still a great leader due to the fact that he often deferred to Zhukov and General Chuikov, leader of the Russian forces inside of Stalingrad. Examples of this can vary from Stalin’s reservation but eventual trust of Zhukov to increase the call up of 300,000 reservists in March 1941 to the implementations of Zhukov’s ideas in the Battle of Stalingrad which included Operation Uranus and Operation Saturn. These led to the destruction of the German Sixth Army and turned the tide of the war.


. The main problem with this view is that in between Stalin was constantly meddling in military affairs in which he had little knowledge. The only important skill of Stalin’s that was useful to the military to study charts and maps due to his exceptional memory. This memory can also be seen in his paranoid rampages as he killed many that he felt had once betrayed him decades earlier. Another key problem was that Stalin had destroyed almost all aspects of initiative within the Red Army due to the fact that they all feared his blind rage. A key example of this is a leader in the Russian military Mikhail Tukhachevsky. He was an accomplished officer in the Civil War on the side of the Bolsheviks, and he attempted to reform the military despite the fact that military amateurs in the country opposed him (Overy 26). As a result, Stalin eventually had him accused of aiding the Germans because of his dissent. Additionally, Stalin was responsible for the murder and imprisonment of Tukhachevsky’s brothers, sisters, daughter, and wife. With such hostile attitudes to loyal and respected officers like Tukhachevsky, it is no wonder that reforms in the Red Army took so long to become realized. Also, Stalin’s tactical errors are quickly seen as Zukhov’s plan to defend Moscow had been realized, but in Stalin’s imprudence, he felt that the surge to push Germany out of Russia must not be stopped despite the warnings of many of his top advisors. The problem Stalin ignored was the fact that the Russian military was severely under equipped. To no surprise, Stalin failed. The death count speaks for itself. Over 400,000 Soviet soldiers were killed as opposed to 80,000 Germans (Overy 122). Stalin had overstretched himself and believed in the power of destiny as opposed to looking at the facts. As a result, Hitler and General Paulus would go on to capture Moscow, giving the Third Reich a second life.


In the end, historians are left with room to debate the quality of Stalin’s true leadership. He clearly lacked the political insight to lead an army effectively, but at the same time, he learned from his mistakes of subverting his own commanders unlike Hitler. For this, he must be given some credit. At the same time, it appears that Stalin was an inspirational force for Russian civilians to participate in the war effort. Without this drive to defend the Motherland, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could have held strong against the Germans. It must also be noted that throughout the military there were many unqualified officers who had made many tactical errors from issues that could range from weapons to positioning of troops and weapons.


Although these things are true, it still does not take away the fact that Stalin’s image and victory have largely been attributed to much good fortune. His enemy’s leader was a raving lunatic, who had neither the supplies, foresight, nor personality to lead a military or country through war. Stalin also happened to lead a country where its people had fervent nationalism along with the ability to tolerate long periods of suffering due to their arduous history. Another fortune was the Japanese lack of loyalty to the Axis powers. If they had attacked the Russians on land, the Russians would have had no chance to defend against the Japanese and Germans. The most impervious of all arguments against Stalin is the simple fact that he was the head fo the political and military realms within the country. Those who maintained much power in the military world were there due to Stalin’s appointments or his acceptance of their power. Obviously, if military commanders made poor strategic decisions, it should be considered Stalin’s fault. Furthermore, even if these commanders were qualified for Stalin’s appointments, many of them were probably scared to tell Stalin what they knew was right for fear of angering Stalin and being murdered or imprisoned. When adding all of these factors together, it was Hitler’s inability to lead along with the Russian people that defeated the Germans in spite of Stalin not because of Stalin.






Works Cited
Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege. Penguin Group. New York, USA. May 1999.
Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad. Orion Publishing Group, Limited. UK. June 2007.
Overy, Richard. Russia’s War. Penguin Group. New York, USA. January 1998.