I really don't know what the author's motivation was in writing the article, but I don't think that, in January, 1941, most Americans suffered from low morale because of demonstrated Japanese capabilities in military aviation. The author had traveled in the Far East, and had apparently done some homework with reference to the Japanese air forces, and Japan in general. He seemed to understand at least some of the fundamental issues affecting effective use of airpower. I think it's quite possible the article was an honest attempt to report what the author thought he knew about the situation. As I stated earlier, many of the points the author makes about Japanese defects later proved to be quite true.

Hindsight, however, tells us that the author was proven wrong in some key areas, particularly the numbers of aircraft the Japanese could employ in attacking Western interests. But we must also be aware that the Japanese air forces gained some of their fearsome early war reputation not because they were ten feet tall, but because of incompetent Allied leadership, and air staffs, not to mention poorly trained Allied pilots. This was particularly true in the Philippines and Malaya/Singapore. When the JAAF and JNAF units began to encounter the Allies "first string" air units, they proved formidable, but certainly not unbeatable. For example, for USN and Marine pilots in the Pacific, at no time during WW II did the kill ratio versus Japanese pilots fall below 1:1 on a monthly basis, and in most months it was extremely favorable for the American pilots.