Quote:
Originally Posted by mac_bolan00
without hardly any naval aviation and battleships to oppose them, the japanese could have consolidated their hold on the islands and even invade australia. granting the US production could erase that loss within two years, the bombing campaign over japan would have been deferred to maybe 1946. that's four years of peaceful skies above japanese factories.
given the luxury of at least two years before the US can launch a counter-offensive, could japan have stockpiled enough petroleum, built enough capital and support ships, and most importantly, modernized its air arm to a point that it can take on third fleet when the time came?
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The short answer is, NO. Japan won't have two years before the American counter-offensive becomes a reality. Peaceful skies above Japanese factories will not stave off starvation of the vital raw materials due to the American submarine campaign which shifted into high gear in mid 1943. The Japanese war machine will still be short of oil, rubber, copper, bauxite, zinc, chromium, and hundreds of other scarce, yet vital commodities.
Consolidation of the Conquered islands/Defensive Line
The Japanese military historically did little to "consolidate" their hold on any of the captured islands in the South Pacific until 1943 when it became painfully obvious that their calculations about American determination to seriously prosecute total war were totally wrong. So it's unlikely that they would do any "consolidation" in the absence of American pressure. Admiral Paul Wenneker, the German naval attache to Japan, made a visit to the conquered territories and had this to say about what he witnessed;
"Early in the war I made a trip through the South Sea Islands (NEI) and up through the MARIANAS to see conditions with my own eyes. I was astounded in the South Seas. The Japanese there were thoroughly enjoying the lush life. They had parties continually and were drinking all the liquor they had captured [at Singapore]
. I asked them why they did not prepare fortifications and do something to make these places stronger, but they said that the Americans would never come, that they could not fight in the jungle and that they were not the kind of people who could stand warfare in the south. As far as I know all those people in those places, both Army and Navy, once they had got into a place where there was no fighting, would do nothing more about the war."
USSBS: Interrogations of Japanese Officials -- 70/359
The Invasion of Australia
The Japanese did discuss the invasion of Australia, but the discussion went nowhere and, indeed, could not have gone anywhere for the simple reason Japan lacked the necessary logistical shipping to even consider supporting such a large scale offensive. The Japanese Navy initially favored an invasion, but only the Japanese Army had enough troops to launch an invasion of a country which approached China in size. The IJA calculated (rather optimistically) that such an invasion would take a minimum of 10-12 divisions and, having been bogged down in China for four years, it had no intention of making such an open-ended manpower commitment. In addition to that, the IJA (correctly) claimed that supporting 10-12 divisions in addition to those already engaged in the Pacific was beyond the logistical capacity of all the shipping available to Japan. So there is not going to be an invasion of Australia no matter what befalls the US Navy.
"Shattered Sword", Parshall and Tully, page 27
The US Production Tsunami
As for US production, historically, the US Navy began commissioning the ships that would overwhelm the Japanese Navy at the end of 1942. In 1943, the USN commissioned either a CV or a CVL every three weeks; This was far beyond the capabilities, or even the imagination, of the Japanese. By mid-1943, the USN had enough carriers, even without the pre-war ships, to crush the IJN. It could have launched the planned Central Pacific offensive without reference to the South Pacific, and it would have been just as fatal to the Japanese defenses. It was the politics of the divided command in the Pacific that delayed the launching of the long awaited assault.