Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger

Part of the thinking was the perception of unreadyness for for war. As with France many of Britians military leaders were telling the PM & others in the cabinent that they could not adaquately defend the nation. The rearmament program would not mature until 1941-1942. The politcal and military leaders assumed that not only would Britan be subjected to submarine warfare as in 1915-1917 but also subject to air attacks with all the horror they were witnessing in Spain & China. None of them wanted to see another round of six figure casualty lists, that now would include many more civilians.

Had the British and French a better intellgence department they might have understood how much bluff there was in Germanys military posture of 1935-1938, Unfortunatly their data was off and their analysis abysmal.

The half hearted attempts to make a alliance with the USSR and Chamberlains efforts to the last minute to negotiate something-anything came from this reluctance to see the deaths of another ten million people as in the Great War.