Quote:
Originally Posted by RAM
Let's throw in a couple of more players in this scenario: the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst.
What if the germans had sent out these warships to raid the supply convoys?
In co-operation with the U-boats they could have wrecked havoc on the convoys, draining the supplies to the landing operation in a critical phase so long that the Wehrmacht go the upper hand on land.
Concerning the allied naval gunfire, they could have countered this with railroad guns like they did in Italy.
Out of range for the naval guns, they could have pounded the landing zone at night.
One poster said that the U-boat would be a minor threat to the invasion.
On the contrary, the U-boats were still a fighting force to take into account by November 1942.
The climax in the U-boat war came six months later, in the spring of 1943, culminating with the so-called Black May.
According to Dönitz' war diary Germany had 100 operational U-boats in November 1942. (From December 1942 to February 1943 there were 102 boats and March-May 115 boats.)
There were 56 boats in the Atlantic, 23 in the Mediterranean, 6 stationed west of Gibraltar, 4 in the North Sea and the rest dispersed elsewhere.
If you think 30 of these were transferred to attack the convoys in the Atlantic in co-operation with Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, the number will be a total of 86, and the loss of supply ships could have been so large that the landing operation would grind to a halt.
With the German capital ships dashing in from the north and most of the allied battleships occupied in protecting the landing forces, the outcome may have turned out to be a disaster to the allies.
Regards
RAM
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Of the U-boats available only about 25 to 30% are at sea at any time. So, one might realistically expect about 30 boats on operational missions. Most of these in late 1942 are still Type VII and suitable only for operations near Britain and in the North Sea. Only the larger Type IX could get into the mid-Atlantic and beyond.
As for raiding convoys, the US need only take a more southerly track to make this difficult or impossible. Instead of a great circle route directly to the landing beaches they could make a similar southerly great circle coming into European waters south of the Azores and then turning north well out to sea between those islands and Portugal to arrive off Southern France on the Atlantic coast.
This would require the Germans to make about a 2000 mile transit just to reach the area. Obviously, this would entail a very high chance of being detected in transit and having another "Bismarck" episode occur.
The one railway gun at Salerno was silenced by naval gunfire. The gun had nowhere to hide like ones at Anzio that regularly fired a few rounds and then retreated into a railway tunnel to avoid retaliation. The greatest threat to ships at Salerno and Anzio were the handful of German bombers from KG 100 and KG 1 that were equipped to drop Fritz X and Hs 293 guided bombs.