Luftwaffe

Looking through Alfred Prices 'Luftwaffe' (sorry I dont have any of his larger books) the followint numbers were gleaned.

For late 1942, October-November, the fighter strength in the Low countries and France was between 150 & 200 fighters equipped & trained for daylight action. There were another 200 day fighters in Germany at the end of 1942. The balance of the fighters in these areas in 1942 were night fighters which ammounted to 400+ by the end of 1942.

Offensive bomber strength in the Low countries and France was 130 twin engine types in mid 1941. Night raids continued on Britian on into 1942, tapering off with the Baedecker raids in 1942 as losses made them impractical. At their peak the Baedecker campaign ammount to 250 night sorties in a week of three raids. In other weeks the raids were typically 30 to fourty aircraft. Bomber units in Germany in late 1942 were school units, which had been partially stripped of instructors to sustain operations in the East & the Med.

That leaves roughly 350 - 400 Luftwaffe day fighters available to quickly send to western France to contest this Allied attack. My numbers for the RAF are weaker. At this point I'm estimating on the low side some 600 Spitfires and remaining Hurricanes in the RAFs front line strength and a similar number of aircraft and pilots in units designated for dispatch to Africa & India or in the training establishment and the other periprial units. With reasonable planning the RAF should be able to commit the bulk of its fighter strength to supporting this attack. A 175 mile tactical range for the Spitfire allows it to cover the Breton penensula until local airfields are established in France.

On the bomber side the RAF was able to 'surge' over 800 bomber sorties for single raids on Germany and keep a sustained pool of 500+ aloft out of over 1000 long range types. There were roughly 300 shorter range medium bombers like the Blenheim also avaiable for front line service.

The USAAF strength in Britian is misleading. The planned number was substantially greater, but the early preperations for Gymnast slowed, and then the susequent preperations for Torch reduced substatially the numbers of fighters and bombers sent to Britian in the second half of 1942. If Sledgehammer had been selected the USAAF aircraft & ground support witheld for Torch would likely be sent to Britian as originally intended. Thus increasing the overall total available to battle the Lufttwaffe.

The only substantial uncommitted German air force would be that in Norway. Taking anything significant from the East or the Med. loses any chance of keeping local air superiority on either front. This is particualry bad in the East as the Soviet winter offensive unfolds.

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