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Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
The one division guarding this part of the coast is the 333rd Infantry. It's responsibility runs from about Lorient to St. Nazarie. This was the division that fought the commando raid on the later when the HMS Campbelton blew up the locks to prevent docking the Bismarck there.
The unit TO&E is:
Grenadier regs 679, 680, 681
Artillery reg 333
Auxiliary units numbered 333
It has no orgainc antiaircraft battalion. Its only air defense is the 2cm AA company in the antitank battalion.
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Even if there was a FLAK battalion how much could the usual eight 8.8 cm guns accomplish?
Quote:
Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
There aren't that many German aircraft in the area. The only two units that are really a threat to naval traffic are KG 100 and Fleiger Fuhrer Atlantik with about 30 to 40 aircraft between them.
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Bring them on. From 1941 the Luftwaffe ahd been playing hide and seek with the RAF in the west. Any attempt to tangle in sustained air combat is in the Germans worst interest. The Luftwaffe airstrikes at the Sicillian ampibious fleet and the same at Salerno suggest what the forward deployed air units might accomplish against a amphibious fleet. The air battle over Tunisia, Sicilly, and Salerno illustrate what happned when the Luftwaffes reinforcements tangled with the larger Allied reinforcements.
Quote:
Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
Hardly. The Germans entered their 1942 summer offensive (the one AGS makes against Stalingrad and the Caucausus) in poor shape. Panzer divisions in the East have only one battalion of tanks on average except for those in AGS half of which have two and one has three. They were short nearly 250,000 men on establishment and only AGS had infantry divisions close to full strength. Most divisions had been cut down to two battalions per regiment from their establishment three (the Type 44 division didn't exist yet).
They had a severe shortage of both trucks and horses. To support AGS all divisions elsewhere were largely stripped of their transport to provide enough trucks to get three Grosstransportraum units for motor transport of supply in AGS.
Whether you think they were winning or losing is irrelevant. The Germans at the end of 1942 were in bad shape.
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In Africa & Italy through 1943 understrength German ground units consistenly failed operationally in the attack against Allied ground and air units. Despite some tactical problems the Allied army, even when 'green' units predominated, shattered every German counter stroke at the operational level. German tactical sucesses did not translate into winning the battle. As with the Luftwaffe the Wehrmacht is chronically understrengh evreywhere. Unlike in 1944 there are not yet any of the fifth & sixth rate formations existant for cannon fodder, to hold fortifications. there aare not yet any Ost battalions to speak of, no non Aryan SS Divsions, no medical battalions of men on light duty to fill emergency posts. Huge numbers of teenagers have not yet replaced adults in Luftwaffe FLAK units in Germany. Neither are the Luftwaffe ground units yet formed. At the start of 1943 the Wehrmacht had a lot fewer actual combat units to work with than in 1944, and they were deep into both a manpower and equipment crisis. As weak as the Soviet forces were they had created this situation. The last thing the Wehrmacht needed was increased pressure from another quarter.
Quote:
Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
Sunk or damaged by what? U-boats will take time to get there. Even when they do there are just three or four battleships present with the same number of carriers out of well over 100 ships present. They are not anchored, and they are escorted.
As for the German surface fleet: Tirpitz is in Norway. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are in Germany and undergoing repairs. Even if all three could go to sea they have to either traverse the North Sea then the Channel and then the Bay of Biscay to get to the fight, or they have to go into the Atlantic through the Iceland gap and then south to the Bay of Biscay. This means bringing several unrep ships along. It also means no escorts.
In either case this suggestion is simply ludicrious. There is no way the Germans could put three capital ships into the area whatsoever. They would be sunk enroute.
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As noted here earlier the Allies managed to deal with the larger French fleet, which had been warned and which was fighting on its home court. I'm wondering if any of those three German ships would have the fuel remaining for a naval battle after circling the British isles and dodging intercepting squadrons.
Quote:
Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
No, the Allies get ashore. They dig in and a temporary stalemate ensues for the next six or so months. There is heavy fighting periodically during this period. In the East the loss of units now fighting in France makes a 1943 come back for the Germans impossible. They are forced onto the defensive and lose more ground than historically.
In North Africa Rommel's forces are partially withdrawn and the reminant defeated. The Allied prisoner bag is much smaller than historical.
The French throw in with the Allies forcing the Germans to invade and take Vichy France pulling more troops West. The Vichy French fight so this invasion and conquest takes weeks and alot of troops to complete.
Italy is still threatened in the Med now that Axis forces are defeated in North Africa.
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Here is the meat of it. A commitment to invading France earlier is a commiitment to coming to grips with the strength of the Wehrmacht. Neither offensive of defensive operations in France in 1943 will be easy. The Wehrmacht is a wounded but dangerous beast. Losses will be high, which is a significant reason why Brooke opposed returning to the continent so soon. It was hoped the bloodshed could be avoided thru delay and the application of other means. The bloodshed was not avoided. The people of the Soviet states endured it. Fortunately for the Allied cause they were willing to endure it and endure enough of it that they could destroy the bulk of the Germans combat strength during 1943 and half of 1944. Getting a Allied Army ashore in late 1942 and establishing several more ashore in early 1943. Not only brings more forces to bear on the on the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, but forces with far greater potiential in firepower than the Soviets of 1943. The bottom line is German military strength fails faster with the Allied armys at their throat than if they stand off at arms length.