Taking a shallow look at the German resources from November 1942 through November 1943 it seems there might be two points of crisis for this version of Sledgehammer. The first would be in the November-January period. Various events might seperately combine to trash the Allies invasion. The Atlantic weather may have interfered more than anticipated. The Allied ground commander may have made some bad decisions; ie: over extending, panicing over a setback, botching his defense against a counter attack. AQ lot of this depends on who the Allied commander is.

The other peak crissi period would be in the spring or very early summer. It is probable Hitler will reduce his ideas for a counter stroke on the Eastern Front (Kursk) and divert a portion of the strength to France. Any diversion of German strength from the East benefits the USSR in the short run. Of course if the Allied enclave is seriously damaged then the USSR will have new problems down the line.

One huge benefit of this early establishment of the Allied in France will be the freeing of the amphibious fleet for other operations in 1943. Even if the Allies dont have large ground forces available due to the demands of the post Sledgehammer battle, they can use the amphib forces as part of one of the deception operations they were so sucessfull at. The Germans were contiually decived as to the overall strength of the Allied armys. They overestimated in 1942-44 as much as the underestimated in 1941. As 1943 unfolds the Germans can be kept amused expecting more Allied armys to come wading ashore in Norway, Marsallie, near Rome, the Damaltian coast, Athens... If a corps or two can be spared from the battle in France then the Germans can be further decived by limted diversion operations in those other directions.

__________________
I forgot my password, can I use yours?