Quote:
Originally Posted by Lippert
I'm gonna have to second some other guys opinions on this one. The Allies as a whole were generally inexperienced at this point. Especially in America, the armed forces were still trying to get and train enough troops for the war to get to an adequate size. Then you want to send US commanders up against German commanders, some of whom were veteran leaders from three different wars. Many of the arguments that Germany would be knocked on its heels are based on the assumption that Allied fighting power and capability would have been the same as in June of 1944.
|
I dont think anyone wrote that Allied fighting power and capability would be the same as in June 1944. I certainly dont think so. In the case of the British it can be argued that they might be better.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lippert
Aside from the technological aspects and almost complete lack of intelligence about enemy weapons systems, there are a few other factors that I think would have contributed to an undoubted defeat of the Allies.
|
What technological aspects are you refering to? The inferiority of the M4 Sherman to the Pz MkIII ? The Spitfire to the Me109? The 6lbr AT gun to the 5cm AT gun, The 25lbr gun or M2 howitzer to the FH18? The M10 TD to the Marder? British and US trucks vs the clapped out French salvage the German were using in Western Europe? The Ju88 vs the B26 or the Blenheim? Perhaps you meant the MG34 or MG42 both above average general purpose machine guns?
Are you certain about the "complete lack of intellegence about enemy weapons systems? What were the principle weapons available to the Germans in France in late 1943 and which of those were 'completely unkown' to the British?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lippert
Additionally, the joint/combined command structure wasn't in place yet.
|
There was a joint/combined command 'structure' in place for the Torch operation of 6 November 1942. For that matter there was a joint/combined command being organized for Operation Gymnast earlier that year. I suspect that with only a single US corps avaialble in Britian for this Sledgehammer varaiant, but four British corps (approx ten divsions) and two army HQ this would be a Brtish show for the first couple months anyway, with The US II Corps a subordinate formation for at least the opening weeks.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lippert
Air power was extremely limited in its effectiveness during the Tunisian campaign because air and ground commanders couldnt get along and properly prioritize missions, among other things.
|
The limits had more to do with the extrreme range of the Allied airfields from the Tunisian battlefield in November & December. The Axis had control of the Bizerte, Tunis, Gabes, and Sfax airfields from the first week. Providing them with all weather airfields directly adjacent to the battlefield. After the Allies establsihed forward airfields the quality & quantity of air support improved. The US side of the air support also improved with the command changes during the winter, when those priority problems were worked out. I cant remark on the state of the British air support for the 1st Army. The 8th Army had already worked out the 'Tentacle' system for liasion and control of tactical air support. The Brits had certainly gone far beyond the method or lack of in the 1940 campaign. By the end of March the Luftwaffe was driven from the battlefield, and the Allied airforces were able to isolate the Axis enclave. That suggests they were able to get a few things right.
This Breton battlefield is easier to reinforce from Brtian than the Tunisian battle area was from the airfields around Algiers and Oran, and even under worst case count for the Allies they will still outnumber the Lufwaffe by a 2-1 margin in Western Europe. More likely it will favor the Allies by a wider margin as the Luftwaffe leaders were not know for making optimal decsions after 1940.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lippert
Lets not forget Patton and Montgomery...
|
Ok what do you not want us to forget?
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lippert
It took some years and some good honing of fighting ability to create a C2 structure that would support major joint/combined operations in the air and on the ground - and we didn't have it by this time.
|
Whatever ability at "C2 structure" the Allies had in 1942 was suffcient to defeat the Axis in Egypt/Lybia and get a army of three corps into Tunisia by the end of 1942. Seven months later it was suffcient to run the Axis out of Tunisia and to place two armys ashore in Sicilly. Whatever improvements there were came by combat experince. I'd suggest more combat experince will bring wider and faster improvements.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Lippert
The better trained and experienced Axis troops would have crushed an initial landing this early in the game - I'm convinced.
|
Ok, better trained and experinced Axis troops would have crushed a intial landing. Were these present at the landing site proposed for this Sledgehammer variant? Those identified by Gardner as present at the landing site, or near enough to reposnd to the initial landing dont look much like 'better trained and experinced'. There are some in France that do qualify for that description, but they are located a fair distance from the proposed landing site, they are in the minority, and none in France are equipped to parity to the British or US units available.
Beyond the relative quality of the Wehrmachts infantry or tank units available in France i'd make a strong argument the Allied army would have a clear superiority in artillery. The guns were equal indivdually to any German weapon, the US fire control methods that served so well in 1944 were already developed and established, the British artillery had worked out its its methods by the end of 1942 and retrained the regiments. The Germans also fielded fewer cannon per corps with both the divsion artillery and the corps/army units being fewer. The ratio in the Wehmacht being about 5-6 battalions of twelve cannon per divsion, and the ratio for the US/British armys being 8 - 9 per divsion. Neither does the Wehrmacht have the 12cm mortars or Nebelwerfers present in suffcient quantity in 1942 to make up for this inferiority in numbers.